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In the current debate on the European Union (EU) fiscal rules there is a widespread consensus on
the need to place more focus on government debt and long-term fiscal sustainability in the
surveillance of budgetary positions. More specifically, pension developments should be taken into
account in assessing fiscal sustainability. The way to make this operational has not yet been defined.
The paper examines the pension expenditure projections available in EU countries and their use in
the assessment of fiscal sustainability. While acknowledging the progress in the availability and
quality of projections, the paper notes that their comparability is still unsatisfactory. Any mechanical
use of existing pension expenditure projections should therefore be avoided. The paper also
examines the different definitions of pension liabilities and their potential role in the EU fiscal
framework. It argues that pension liabilities may bring a clearer understanding of the impact of
fiscal policies, may provide a measure of the cost of terminating pay-as-you-go pension schemes
and may be useful for the measurement of deficits computed on accrual basis. However, the level of
pension liabilities does not provide indications concerning the sustainability of pension schemes and
their effects on public budgets. Pension liabilities should not be added to conventional debt. The
paper argues that both pension expenditure projections and estimates of pension liabilities can
complement the deficit and debt indicators currently used in the EU fiscal rules. The paper
concludes by pointing to the need of improving some technical and organisational aspects
concerning age-related expenditure projections, such as the independence of forecasters, the
transparency of projections and the homogeneity of methods.
                                                
* Economic Research Department, Banca d’Italia. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do
not commit the Banca d’Italia.2
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
The search for rules and procedures that ensure sound budgetary positions has been at the core of
the development of the fiscal framework of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU). Since
the early 1990s budgetary discipline has been recognised as an essential condition for the success of
EMU. In 1992 the Treaty of Maastricht set the deficit and debt conditions for access to EMU. The
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), adopted by the European Council in Amsterdam in June 1997,
complemented the Treaty with a view to reconcile permanent restraint of deficit and debt levels with
margins for fiscal stabilisation policies. The Pact also strengthened the monitoring procedures
accompanying the quantitative rules.
EMU’s fiscal framework demands more than what is strictly necessary for sustainability. This
reflects,   , the ambiguity of the economic theory on fiscal sustainability and the
multinational dimension of EMU. This pragmatic solution can increase the scope for stabilisation
policies with respect to the recent past and contribute to allowing EU countries to meet the
budgetary pressures caused by the ageing of their population on a sounder fiscal position.
In recent years, several suggestions to assign a greater role to long-term sustainability in the EMU
framework have been put forward. A widespread consensus on the need to place more focus on
government debt and sustainability in the surveillance of budgetary positions seems also to emerge
from the current debate on the EU fiscal rules. This point has been raised by the European
Commission, the European Council, the IMF and the OECD. According to these institutions, a
properly grounded sustainability analysis should take into account the effects of population ageing
on public finances. In particular, pension expenditure developments should be considered.
Future expenditure trends can be integrated into fiscal sustainability analysis in many ways. This
paper aims at contributing to the current debate by exploring the role of pension expenditure
projections and of pay-as-you-go pension (PAYG) liabilities.
The paper notes that sustainability issues should be primarily addressed by considering the
projections concerning the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio and the contribution rate that assures
the cash balance of pension schemes. However, in view of the still unsatisfactory comparability of
pension expenditure projections (across countries and across research centres), the paper suggests to
avoid any mechanical use of existing projections. It also suggests improving some technical and
organisational aspects concerning age-related expenditure projections, such as the independence of
forecasters, the transparency of projections and the homogeneity of methods used.
A more radical solution would require assimilating PAYG pension liabilities to public debt, to
consider social contributions as loans to public pension schemes and pension spending as loan
repayments. After having examined the different definitions of pension liabilities and their
economic implications, the paper argues that the level of pension liabilities does not provide
indications concerning the sustainability of current pension policies and the effects of pension
schemes on public budgets. Therefore, the paper argues that pension liabilities should not be added3
to conventional debt. Moreover, current estimates of pension liabilities present the same problems
affecting the quality and comparability of pension expenditure projections.
Rather, the paper suggests complementing the current deficit and debt indicators with additional
indicators concerning future budgetary developments and a broader definition of public sector
liabilities. In this context, estimates of pension liabilities may represent a useful complement to
conventional fiscal indicators. They may bring a clearer understanding of the impact of fiscal
policies, may provide a measure of the cost of terminating pay-as-you-go pension schemes and may
be useful for the measurement of deficits computed on accrual basis.
Section 2 briefly surveys the approach to fiscal sustainability taken by the European Union. Section
3 examines the pension expenditure projections available in EU countries. Section 4 considers the
different definitions of pension liabilities, the indications that they provide and overviews the
existing estimates. Section 5 compares pension expenditure projections and pension liabilities in
view of the assessment of fiscal sustainability in the EU framework. Section 6 highlights further




	#Fiscal soundness is the main objective of EMU rules.
1 In
defining a fiscal framework aimed at safeguarding the credibility of the single monetary authority
and at avoiding monetary policy to be overburdened in its pursuit of price stability, the EU was
confronted with several problems.
2
First, while the intuition is clear (a sustainable policy must ultimately avoid insolvency), the
analytical and operational definition of sustainability is not straightforward. Economic theory has
proposed different conditions for sustainability (from a non ever-rising tax rate to an inter-temporal
discounted budget constraint). The operational indications are not straightforward. For example,
even if we agree that in order to be sustainable the debt-to-GDP ratio must be stable, we have no
indication as to which stable level is sustainable. To assess the maximum sustainable debt level one
should consider the interaction of public finance and the economy (and there is not an agreed upon
theory on that). Moreover, difficulties arise also with regards to the definition of the variables to be
used in the analysis (should gross or net debt be used? how should the deficit be measured?).
Second, the rules were to be applied to a group of countries, each retaining fiscal sovereignty. A
general commitment to carry out sound fiscal policies was not sufficient. Monetary stability
represents a public good to which all governments contribute by maintaining sustainable budget
                                                
1 The rationale for EMU rules is discussed, e.g., in Buti and Sapir (1998) and in Brunila, Buti and Franco (2002).
2 Balassone and Franco (2000a, 2001).4
positions. As with all public goods, there is an incentive for each government to exploit the benefits
accruing from the discipline of others without contributing itself. This creates a double cost for the
other governments: the free-rider’s excessive indebtedness can put pressure on interest rates to rise.
It can also result in bankruptcies requiring bail-outs.
Third, the deficit and debt positions of EU countries in the early 1990s were very different. Some
countries were clearly in unsustainable fiscal positions, with high and rising debt and deficit ratios
and large expected expenditure increases. In order to induce a sharp change in the budgetary policies
of these countries, tight numerical parameters were required. Since it was politically difficult to
differentiate the conditions set for accession to EMU from those envisaged to be a permanent
feature of the Union’s fiscal framework,
3 the former substantially affected the latter.
When confronted with these difficulties, the EU adopted a pragmatic approach. The Treaty of
Maastricht defines sustainability as non-violation of arbitrarily predetermined parametric standards,
which are 3 and 60 per cent of GDP for deficit and debt respectively.
4 The Treaty makes no
distinction between current outlays and investment.
5 The deficit ceiling is reminiscent of the
constant deficit assumption analysed by Domar (1944). Apparently conscious of the partial
equilibrium nature of Domar’s results, the debt ceiling avoids convergence to high levels of debt.
The SGP later introduced a medium term target of a position “close to balance or in surplus” thus
tightening the deficit rule while also trying to reconcile it with counter-cyclical fiscal policy.
6 The
equilibrium value of the debt ratio depends on the numerical definition of this position which, in
turn, is to be determined so as to allow enough room for stabilisation policy while avoiding to
breach the 3 per cent deficit threshold during cyclical downturns.
The implied policy stance may often be tighter than what is needed for sustainability by whatever
definition.
7 If EU countries stick to the close-to-balance guideline, they will converge to equilibrium
debt levels much below the 60 per cent threshold. Some countries might even converge to negative
debt levels. One may question whether a theory-based benchmark, if available, would have implied
these results. No definition actually envisages the abolition of public debt.
                                                
3 This was due, , to the possibility of other countries joining EMU at a later stage. Moreover, it was clear
that the reduction of debt to acceptable levels required long periods of fiscal restraint.
4 Article 121 requires “the sustainability of the government financial position” for a country’s eligibility to EMU.
Article 104 defines the criteria to evaluate sustainability by means of reference values for deficit and debt to GDP
ratios. The economic rationale of the parameters has indeed been questioned, see Buiter  . (1993) and
Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1996) for a discussion.
5 However article 104 includes capital outlays among the relevant factors for the assessment of member states’
budgetary positions.
6 Leeftink (2000) tests for the consistency of the two objectives, while Lindh and Ohlson (2000) doubt the capability
of the Pact to ensure that budgetary policy reacts symmetrically to positive and negative cyclical developments.
7 See Pasinetti (1997), Kinnunen and Kuoppamaki (1998), Balassone and Monacelli (2000). Cronin and McCoy
(2000) argue that the rules set in the SGP may prove too tight for countries with underdeveloped infrastructures.5
The SGP combines the traditional requirement to balance the budget with the call for letting the
budget adapt to cyclical conditions. It also recognises the role of extraordinary finance.
8
The definition of the debt and deficit indicators relevant for EMU’s fiscal rules takes into account
the need to ensure comparability of national statistics and to allow a regular surveillance process.
Methodological choices were made with pragmatism. The sector of reference is general
government, as defined in the European System of Accounts (ESA) under the responsibility of
Eurostat. Debt and deficit are respectively defined as the total of gross general government
liabilities at nominal (face) value and as the balance of non-financial transactions (as defined in the
ESA) of general government.
9
Reference to a common protocol is obviously helpful for international comparison. Using
definitions in line with those adopted by Statistical Offices makes immediately available past data
and allows to base forecasts on the most detailed databases. [The choice of a gross measure for debt
also depends on data availability, since data on assets are not always available and their quality is
often poor. However, these solutions come at a cost. The definitions adopted for debt and deficit are
not consistent (i.e. the ESA95 deficit does not coincide with the change in debt).
10]
	      	 # The EMU fiscal framework does not make
sustainability indicators unnecessary. Due to, , demographic changes, compliance over the
short and medium term does not necessarily ensure compliance over the long term. There is a need
for indicators highlighting prospective deviations and measuring their size and timing.
The issue of long-term sustainability has gradually gained importance in the assessment and design
of fiscal policy. In a report on the co-ordination of economic policies to the European Council held
in December 1999, the Ecofin noted the need for an explicit reference to the sustainability of public
finances. The Ecofin called for a broadening of the issues covered by the Stability and Convergence
programmes to medium and long-term sustainability problems. Subsequently, several European
Councils highlighted the population ageing problem and, in particular, its implications for
maintaining adequate and sustainable pensions.
11 In particular, in March 2001 the European Council
held in Stockholm established a three-pronged strategy to tackle the budgetary implications of
ageing population. The strategy envisages raising employment rates (especially amongst women and
older workers), reducing public debt and reforming pensions and health-care systems.
                                                
8 The cyclical events to be considered extraordinary are explicitly defined.
9 Financial instruments to be considered and accounting criteria to be used are also specified in the ESA. For an
extensive analysis see Mink and Rodriguez-Vives (2004). Some problematic aspects are examined in Balassone 
	 (2004).
10 In particular, with the adoption of the 1995 version of the ESA, deficit figures are based on accrual accounting.
11 The European Council held in Lisbon in March 2000 stressed the need to study the future evolution of social
protection from a long-term perspective, with particular attention to the sustainability of pensions.6
The Council also agreed that long-term fiscal sustainability should be regularly reviewed. The
review would be done under the Broad economic policy guidelines and in the Stability and
Convergence programmes presented each year by Member States. This decision extended the
framework of the EU multilateral surveillance and introduced a specific commitment for the
Commission to examine the long-term sustainability of public finances.
In view of the lack of a consensus on the definition of sustainability of public finances, in its
assessments of the Stability and Convergence programmes, the European Commission follows a
pragmatic approach. It addresses three policy questions: (i) Given the projected budgetary
implications of population ageing, will the budgetary requirements of the Maastricht Treaty be
respected on the basis of current policies? (ii) Are the medium-term budgetary targets outlined in
the programmes compatible with an improvement of the sustainability of public finances? (iii) What
are the main policy challenges facing Member States and what reforms should be envisaged?
In November 2002, in its Communication on 

the European Commission suggested that sustainability concerns should be explicitly taken into
account when assessing the budgetary positions of Member States under the SGP. To this end,
greater weight should be attached to government debt ratios in the budgetary surveillance process;
more specifically, the debt criterion set by the Treaty of Maastricht should be made operational.
12  In
addition, the assessment of the sustainability of public finances – as part of the Stability and
Convergence programmes – should be upgraded, with firm policy conclusions as to whether the
budgetary policies are ambitious enough to meet the challenge posed by ageing populations.
In its most recent contribution to the debate on strengthening the implementation of the SGP,
13 the
Commission also notes that in defining the required debt reduction it is necessary to take into
account the need to ensure prudent debt ratios before the impact of ageing takes fully place.
Moreover, the Commission stresses that a better knowledge of the factors influencing long-term
sustainability of public finances such as pension and contingent liabilities
14 and assets is required.
Further deepening the comprehension of these developments would help to integrate them better
into the fiscal framework.
There are several ways in which more attention can be placed on the factors that may influence the
medium and long-term dynamics of the debt. This paper explores two main possibilities: the use of
pension expenditure projections made at the EU level by each Member State and the use of pension
liabilities.
                                                
12 This is done along the lines developed in European Commission (2004a) report.
13 European Commission (2004b).
14 A contingent liability can be defined as a public sector action that determines a cash expenditure only if and when a





This section examines the pension expenditure projections available in EU countries, at both the
national and the international level, their use in the EU fiscal framework and some problematic
aspects concerning the quality and comparability of the projections. Some methodological aspects
concerning long-term expenditure projections are examined in Annexes 1 and 2.
	
 – All EU countries have developed
models for projecting pension spending. This is a relatively recent developments: till the mid-1990s
the availability of projections in EU countries was very uneven and their quality was sometimes
unsatisfactory.
15 The development of better forecasting models has been boosted by the decision to
start joint projection exercises at the EU level (see Box 1).
Projections are usually made for periods of 30 to 50 years, although occasionally they extend to 75
years. Trends in expenditure items are generally evaluated in terms of their incidence on GDP or in
terms of some synthetic indicator (as, in the case of forecasts of pension outlays, the equilibrium
contributory rate). National projections primarily cover first pillar pension schemes, including
private and public sector employees and self-employed workers. A full coverage appears only in a
subset of EU countries (EPC, 2003).
16 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have in
their projections a full coverage of all social benefits, both in cash and in kind. This allows them to
have a broad picture of the impact of ageing on the expenditure side of public finance.
In most EU countries national long-term projections are regularly updated to take into account
changes in legislation, in the economic context and in the demographic scenario. In Denmark,
Sweden and the UK projections are updated more than once a year; in Belgium, Germany and Italy
once a year.
17 Updates are less frequent in Austria (3 years), Ireland (2 years) and in the Netherlands
(4 years). Irregular updating is being done in Finland, France and Portugal. In Greece a 
  has been recently established and it is in charge of producing long-term
projections on a regular basis.
                                                
15 Franco and Munzi (1996) review the projections available at the national level in the 15 EU Member States in the
mid-1990s...
16 Austria, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK do not project at least some part of the pension system in their national
exercises.
17 In Germany this applies to projections performed for the general statutory pension scheme, whereas projections for




Over the past decade, all EU countries have developed models for forecasting the financial situation of
public pension systems.
 A review of the forecasts on pension outlays for the period 1995-2030 carried out by
public institutions in the fifteen EU member countries in the early 1990s found an average increase in the
ratio of pension spending to GDP ranging between 3 and 4 points, i.e. about a tenth of a point per year
(Franco and Munzi, 1996). The exercises pointed to a significant increase in spending not only in many
countries that had not yet reformed their pension systems (Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) but also in some countries that had already enacted major reforms (Finland, France and
Germany). Relatively limited increases in spending were expected in Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom. In many countries the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP in 2030 was projected to be
between 15 and 20 per cent.
There is a tendency towards a more regular release of projections. In the United Kingdom, since 1975 the
Government Actuary’s Department has revised the long-term forecasts of the National Insurance Scheme
every five years. One section of each forecasting report describes the changes from the previous set of
projections. In Germany, the Federal Government releases 15-year projections every year. The need for
regular forecasts (every five years) was acknowledged in Ireland in the 1993 report of the National Pensions
Board and in Spain by the Toledo Pact of 1995. In Italy, forecasting activity has found increasing legislative
support. A law in 1988 established that technical reports on draft bills concerning pensions must include
projections covering at least ten years. In 1995 it was further decided that starting in 1998 the annual
Economic and Financial Planning Document must have a special section projecting pension spending for the
subsequent decade.
In the last few years, a number of countries produced new estimates of pension spending trends. In some
cases they are aimed at simply evaluating the future pension expenditure on the basis of existing conditions
(Blanco Moreno 	, 2000); in others, they are directed to the enactment of further reforms (Charpin,
1999). In still others, they are intended to help determine the best policy for dealing with the problems posed
by population ageing.
In the Netherlands, the Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (2000) forecasts pension spending within a
projection of the entire government budget in which population ageing significantly affects health and
welfare spending and some revenue items as well. The report seeks to assess the conditions under which the
public finances may prove sustainable in the long term and considers possible actions on budget policy, the
labour market, the pension system and health care. The various solutions are weighed both in terms of
efficient resource allocation and in terms of intergenerational redistribution.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs of Denmark (2000) forecasts public pension outlays as part of an exercise
designed principally to project the total income of retirees, including private retirement plans and investment
income. The report estimates the composition of these incomes and the income replacement rate vis-à-vis
earnings from labour, for different population deciles in 1996 and 2045. It examines the relation between
pension system and labour market, specifically for people aged 60 to 66 and it evaluates the overall
prospects for the public finances, also considering the implications of alternative economic policy scenarios
for the various generations.9
Across countries there are also differences concerning forecasters. In particular, the forecasting
process may involve officially or unofficially several actors: social partners, independent experts,
social security institutions and public bodies (committees, working groups, etc.) made by
officials from the public administration, external experts, social partners and representatives of the
national Parliament.
18
In EU countries long-term projections are used to set up budgetary medium-term targets,
19 to plan
major reforms with an impact on budgetary positions, to project the debt profile and to assess the
long-term sustainability of public finances.
The assessment of long-term sustainability of public finances is conducted primary by Ministries of
Finance or Economy but there are cases where the Social or Labour Ministries or other public
institutions are involved. A key issue is the definition of long-term sustainability of public finances.
It can refer to debt dynamics or to a budget balance position.
20
                                                
18 In Germany, each annual update of pension expenditure projections is object of consultation: it is usually organised
a workshop on methodology and main assumptions that involve the Pension Insurance institutions and the Federal
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. Other institutions are also consulted and at the end of the process a special
advisory board assesses the results and forwards the assessment to the Federal Parliament. In Austria, there is a
consultant body to the federal government composed of ministry representatives, social partners and researchers
that discusses projections and presents a report to the government. In Portugal, an inter-ministerial working group
on ageing discusses technical aspects of the projections. Ad hoc groups are established in the Irish Finance
Ministry (the ) and in Belgium ( !"). In France, a body
attached to the Prime Minister’s Office co-ordinates the consultation with many different actors (social partners,
Parliament, Ministry of Finance, etc.) In most cases the final responsibility for producing long-term projections is
within a governmental body, mainly the Treasury or Finance Ministry or the Labour or Social Affairs Ministry.
19 This is the case for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In the Netherlands, for instance,
since long-term projections indicate that the elimination of public debt within this generation would allow to cover
part of the costs of ageing through interest savings, the medium-term budgetary target is then defined to achieve
this result. In Sweden and Denmark projections have been used in setting the medium-term target of 2% of GDP
surplus. Belgium and Finland fix medium-term targets in order to be consistent with a projection where the
budgetary path ensures long-term sustainability, taking into account the likely impact of ageing.
20 In the Netherlands and Denmark long-term sustainability is evaluated on the debt basis: public finances are
considered sustainable if debt is not on an “explosive path”, implying a constant debt to GDP ratio over the long-
term. Other countries, for instance Sweden, refer to the debt to GDP ratio ceiling established by the Maastricht
Treaty considering sustainable only debt path that does not exceed the reference value over the entire projection
horizon. In Italy two ways to assess long-term sustainability of public finances are used: the first one refers to a
debt reduction towards 60% of GDP; the second one looks at the impact of different debt structure scenarios on the
cost of debt and on real GDP growth rates and this analysis is then used to project the evolution of the debt to GDP
ratio in a long-term perspective. Belgium and Austria refer more explicitly to the necessity of maintaining each
year a budget position which is balanced or in surplus over the cycle. In the United Kingdom sustainability is
defined as meeting the government’s sustainable investment rule, which says that net debt should remain below
40% of GDP over the economic cycle. In addition the United Kingdom presents other indicators such as fiscal gaps
and the intertemporal budget gaps to provide further information on sustainability. In Germany, the indicators refer
more directly to the pension system: for the statutory pension scheme long-term sustainability has been defined by
setting specific reference values for the maximum rate of contribution as well as for the standard benchmark of the
replacement rate; for the civil servants’ pension scheme long-term sustainability is assessed by looking at the
pension to tax ratio and the pension to GDP ratio for this particular type of pension expenditure.10
Projections typically include a baseline scenario representing a continuation of current policies,
particularly with respect to social insurance legislation (in terms of eligibility conditions and the
amount of the benefits) and alternative scenarios for relevant economic and demographic variables
(low and high population scenarios, lower and higher productivity growth scenarios, lower
unemployment rate scenario, lower and higher interest rates scenarios). These alternative exercises
may also seek to evaluate the impact of specific policy adjustments or of alternative policy
assumptions (e.g., changing the age of pension eligibility).
21
Finally, projections are usually deterministic, implying that even when accompanied by stress tests,
they confer no sense of the likelihood of any specific scenario taken into consideration. Sometimes,
one observes a pairing of assumptions that might yield the most optimistic or pessimistic case but
that may be unlikely to occur together.
The issue of long-term term fiscal trends has been gaining importance at the EU level since the late
1990s. After some technical work carried out by the Commission,
22 in 1999 a technical working
group (the Ageing Working Group – AGW) was set up to examine the economic and budgetary
implications of ageing populations and provide expenditure projections (see Box 2).
23 The AWG
provides projections of public expenditure on pensions, on health and long-term care and a number
of indicators of long-term fiscal sustainability.
24 The projections involve the use of the forecasting
models developed by national authorities but are based on common demographic forecasts and
assumptions on key economic parameters such as labour market developments, productivity growth
and real interest rates.
25 The projection exercises increase the comparability of national forecasts,
though leaving responsibility for the projections to the national authorities, which have the best
institutional and statistical knowledge.
The AWG exercises refer to a current policy scenario, which does not necessarily represent what
Member States consider to be the most likely scenario, but rather the consensus reached in the group
as to what would constitute a prudent and reasonable starting point. The AWG estimates are based
on the demographic projections prepared by Eurostat on the basis of assumptions regarding fertility
                                                
21 For a brief description of the models and scenario adopted by EU countries, see the table in the Annex 2.
22 Franco and Munzi (1996 and 1997).
23 The Ageing Working Group was set up by the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the EU. The group includes
experts from national administrations, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the OECD.
24 Economic Policy Committee (2000, 2001 and 2003).





In Economic Policy Committee (2000) the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio is predicted to rise in all EU
countries but the United Kingdom over the coming decades. In some countries, the rise is significant.
Expenditure peaks are reached at different times. In particular, in the majority of countries the effects of
ageing will add 3 to 5 percentage points of GDP to pension expenditure: Austria (3.1 per cent by 2030),
Belgium (3.7 per cent, peaking in 2040), Denmark (4.5 per cent, by 2030), Finland (4.7 per cent, by 2040),
France (3.9 per cent, by 2030), Germany (4.3 per cent, by 2050 or after), and Ireland (4.4 per cent, by 2050
of after). In some countries the upward pressure is even higher: the Netherlands (6.2 per cent, by 2040),
Spain (8.3 per cent, by 2050), and Portugal (6.2 per cent, by 2030). Moreover, the results have been
decomposed according to the four explanatory factors driving the projected changes in pension spending:
the population ageing effect, which measures the changes in the ratio of persons aged 55 over the population
aged 15 to 54; the employment effect, which indicates the changes in the share of population in working age
(15 to 64) that is employed; the eligibility effect, which measures the share of the population aged 55 and
over that receive a pension; the benefit effect, which captures changes in the average pension relative to
output per worker. Sensitivity tests were carried out to gauge the impact of changes in various parameters,
i.e. population, participation rate, employment rate, productivity rate and interest rate. A policy simulation
based upon the successful implementation of the Lisbon strategy was also carried out compared with the
“current policy scenario”.
Economic Policy Committee (2001) builds upon the previous report: for some countries the data provided
have been supplemented and in some cases updated to incorporate the impact of recent reforms.
(1)
Notwithstanding these changes, Economic Policy Committee (2001) confirms the previous results. The
projections show that for the EU as a whole, public pension spending is projected to peak in 2040 at 13.6
per cent of GDP from 10.4 per cent in 2000. It should be noted that the projection exercise has only
considered pension expenditures and not revenues to pension systems, although some Member States did
report data.
According to Economic Policy Committee (2003), the ageing populations will lead to an increase in public
spending (including not only pensions but also other age related items) of between 3 and 7 percentage points
of GDP by 2050 if no corrective action is taken (Table 1). Most of the increase will derive from pensions,
health and long-term care spending, whereas savings stemming from education and unemployment benefits
will be limited. In particular, public spending on pensions is projected to increase by between 3 and 5
percentage points of GDP, largely driven by the increase in the old-age dependency ratios. Reforms in the
1990s, especially the indexation of entitlements to prices and extension of assessment periods, appear to
have mitigated the expenditure increases in some countries. Demographic changes would lead to a rise in
public spending on health and long-term care by between 1.5 and 4 percentage points of GDP up to 2050.
However, there are upside and downside risks to the projections results as the impact of non-demographic
factors was not explicitly modelled. Public expenditure in education is expected to decline in the next 50
years, but significant savings are projected only in some countries. Using the labour force assumptions,
unemployment benefit spending will show very modest decreases in most Member States.
—————————
(1) For a summary description of recent reforms, see European Commission (2000a), EPC (2003), and
Franco and Marino (2003). The reforms regarded indexing (Germany and Italy), the reference period
for calculating the pension award (Spain), the retirement age for women (Austria, Belgium, Germany
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Belgium 23.9 22.5 22.9 24.1 27.0 27.9 27.5 3.7
Denmark 28.5 29.1 31.0 32.7 34.3 34.7 33.9 5.4
Germany 24.0 23.7 23.4 24.9 28.4 29.9 30.2 6.1
Greece 21.8 21.1 21.1 24.0 28.8 33.5 34.8 13.0
Spain 21.3 19.3 19.1 20.2 23.0 26.9 28.7 7.4
France 26.5 26.3 26.9 29.3 30.6 30.6 30.5 4.0
Ireland 10.1 9.6 9.7 11.2 11.9 12.2 13.2 3.1
Italy 24.2 24.4 24.5 25.5 26.6 27.1 25.8 1.6
Luxembourg 7.6 7.4 7.9 8.6 9.5 9.8 9.5 1.9
Netherlands 21.4 21.8 23.1 25.5 28.3 30.4 30.3 8.9
Austria 26.9 27.1 27.4 28.5 31.3 32.1 31.1 4.2
Portugal 21.5 22.0 23.0 24.6 24.9 25.5 25.1 3.5
Finland 25.3 24.8 25.5 27.1 30.2 32.0 31.8 6.5
Sweden 27.0 26.8 27.2 27.8 30.0 31.0 30.6 3.6
UK 17.4 17.5 17.3 17.0 18.0 17.3 18.0 0.6
EU 15 21.8 21.6 22.0 23.4 25.5 26.7 26.7 4.9
Source: EPC (2003).
(1) The table brings together the results of the AWG’s “current policy scenario” projections for spending on pensions, health and long-term care using
the per capita GDP costs rule completed in 2001, with the projections for public expenditure on education and unemployment benefits completed in
2003. Pension spending forecasts for Austria, France, Germany, Spain and Portugal take into account the effects of the recent pension reforms and the
revised population projections.
rates, life expectancy and migration.
26 Long-run projections for social expenditures are heavily
influenced also by assumptions on labour market developments and other macroeconomic
variables.
27
                                                
26 In Eurostat baseline scenario fertility rates are projected to converge upward to an average of 1.7 for the EU by
2050 (the average EU fertility rate in 2000 stood at 1.5), with most of the increase occurring in the coming two
decades. Regarding migration flows, it is assumed a net inward migration to EU countries of about 640,000 people
per year (about 0.2 per cent of the total population). Life expectancy is projected to steadily increase over the
projection period: for men it is projected to rise from 75 years in 2000 to 80 years by 2050; for women, from 81 to
85.
27 The AWG in Economic Policy Committee (2000 and 2001) used the same assumptions agreed in the OECD
projection exercise. Labour force participation rates up to 2010 are based on projections by the International13
	       	 ! The expenditure projections
provided by the AWG are used for building up sustainability indicators which provide a quantitative
estimate of the budgetary adjustments required for a Member State to ensure sustainable public
finances and compliance with the SGP. The starting point is either given by the general government
today accounts or by the end-period forecasts provided for in the Stability and Convergence
programmes. The initial non-pension primary expenditure and revenue are kept constant over time
while the pension expenditure developments are projected on the basis of a set of assumptions on
demographics, labour participation rates and other relevant variables. Given certain assumption
concerning GDP growth and interest rates, the increase in the spending ratio is used to project the
primary balance and debt dynamics (see Box 3).
These computations are then used for building up tax gaps (also called “sustainability gaps”), i.e.
the difference between the current tax ratio and the constant ratio that would be needed over the
projection period to achieve a pre-determined budgetary target at a specified date in the future (for
correcting the projected values which take into account the pension-expenditure projections). Since
the choice of both the targeted debt ratio and the length of the projection period is arbitrary, the
European Commission calculates three different tax gaps, covering a range of definitions of
sustainability used in the literature:
•   the first one measures the difference between the current and constant tax ratio required to reach
the same debt level in 2050 that would result from a balanced budget position over the entire
projection period (known as T-1);
•   the second one recognises that the requirement of debt levels converging to zero implied by the
first tax gap is an overly strict definition to ensure sustainability of public finances and so it
measures the difference between the current and constant tax ratio required to reach a debt level
of 40 per cent of GDP in 2050 (known as T-2);
•   the third one draws from the economic literature based on the present value budget constraint. It
indicates the change in tax revenue as a share of GDP that would guarantee the respect of the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government. In this case there is no target for the debt
level but it will converge towards a relatively low level. Furthermore, there is no cut-off date
and this requires the assumption that age-related expenditures remain constant as a ratio to GDP
at the projected level in 2050 (known as T-3).
                                                                                                                                                                 
Labour Organisation (ILO, 1997). Thereafter, labour force participation rates are constant for men and rising for
women (the latter rates reach in 2050 levels of 5 to 10 points lower than those assumed for men). Unemployment
rates are assumed to fall to their structural level by 2005, as defined by the OECD, and to stay constant thereafter.
For the EU, this results in unemployment falling to 8 per cent. The AWG agreed that labour productivity growth
should converge towards an annual rate level of 1.75 per cent by 2030, although some leeway for higher rates is





On the basis of the updates of the stability and convergence programmes submitted by EU Member States at
the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, the European Commission found risks of budgetary imbalances
inconsistent with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in seven countries (Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal). Other three countries (Finland, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom) did not pass the stress test assuming a one per cent of GDP deviation from their medium-term
budget target in 2005 and carried over up to 2050.
In the updates of the stability and convergence programmes submitted between the end of 2002 and the first
half of 2003, twelve countries presented long-run projections conducted by national institutions (European
Commission, 2003). For four countries these projections were significantly different from the EPC
projections. In all these cases, the updates indicated more favourable developments than those obtained by
the EPC. Even assuming that all countries achieve the budget targets set for 2006, the European Commission
found that there is a risk that public finances are not sustainable in six countries (Austria, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Portugal) and in the EU as a whole. The Commission therefore asked for further policy
measures.
The debt developments would follow a U-shaped curve in most countries: the level would initially decline
given the favourable starting budgetary positions and would worsen when the impact of ageing takes hold.
In most countries the largest increase in the debt will occur between 2020 and 2030. The European
Commission stresses that the risk of non-sustainable public finances increases in all countries that do not
achieve budget position close to balance or in surplus. This is most relevant for countries with high debt
level (France, Germany, Italy and Portugal). Finally, the tax gap indicators reveal that additional permanent
budgetary adjustments between 1 and 2 percentage points of GDP are needed in those EU countries where
sustainability of public finance is a concern.
On the basis of the 2003 updates of the stability and convergence programmes, EPC (2003) estimates that
even assuming that all EU countries achieve their medium term budgetary targets there is a risk of
unsustainable public finances in at least one third of them. Debt developments for most countries follow a
U-shaped pattern: in the coming twenty or twenty-five years debt levels are projected to decrease as a
consequence of the maintaining of balanced budget positions but this trend would start to reverse once the
budgetary impact of ageing starts to prevail, with the largest increase in most countries expected between
2030 and 2050.
The risk of unsustainable public finances increases considerably if countries do not reach a budget position
of close to balance or in surplus. This is shown comparing the projected debt levels under the “programme
scenario” with the “2003 budgetary position” scenario. This is particularly true for the six euro-area
countries with highest underlying cyclically adjusted deficits in 2003 (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands and Portugal). The sustainability gap under the “programme scenario” indicates that an
additional permanent budgetary adjustment of between 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points of GDP is needed in
countries where the sustainability of public finances is a concern.15
These indicators are calculated for two scenarios: the programme scenario and “current year”
scenario, where the starting point is the current budget position. The latter scenario demonstrates the
long-term impact on debt developments, and consequently on the sustainability of public finances,
of a failure to achieve the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ requirement of the SGP for those countries
still in deficit, in accordance with the timetable set down in their stability or convergence
programmes.
The EPC has a mandate to deliver a new set of common budgetary projections by mid-2005 for all
25 EU countries. A number of guiding principles for the design and execution of the projection
exercise has been agreed upon in order for the AWG to fulfil this ambitious mandate: i) an
appropriate balance between the need for simplicity and economic relevance has to be found in
choosing the methodology to be used to forecast age-related public expenditure items; ii) in order to
ensure comparability, adjustments for individual country specific circumstances should be kept to a
minimum with the principle of equal treatment for all countries being respected; iii) the assumptions
underlying the expenditure projections should be consistent with each other (i.e., the assumptions on
participation rates of women need to be consistent with developments of the fertility rates); iv) the
assumptions underlying the projections should be adopted on a prudent basis, so as to avoid the risk
of underestimating the possibility of serious economic and budgetary challenges emerging in the
long run; v) all key inputs and assumptions used for the projections should be clearly specified,
along with the projection models.
The coming exercise will aim at providing policy makers with a better assessment of the sources of
risks to public finances in the long-run. The exercise will involve sensitivity tests. Where possible,
probabilities will be attached to alternative scenarios. To this end, the following steps have been
agreed by the AWG.
•   First, projections should cover the period up to 2070, because otherwise it would not be
sufficient to cover the working lives of all persons alive today and thus would not cover the
pension entitlements of younger age cohorts who have recently, or will shortly, enter the labour
force. Moreover, in countries where the baby-boom effect occurred later, the population size and
structure will not have stabilised around a new equilibrium level by 2050.
•   Second, the new projections would be based on a revised set of population projections prepared
by Eurostat. Appropriate sensitivity tests for different scenarios on population developments
would be carried out.
•   Third, the age-related expenditure projections would continue to be made using national models
and agreed, but more tightly specified, assumptions on key economic parameters.
•   Fourth, the same underlying assumptions on economic parameters (participation and
employment rates, productivity growth, real interest rates) will be used in all the projection16
exercises. To this end, a discussion will first take place in the AWG on each economic
assumption in order to take into account country-specific situations. Thereafter, the European
Commission will propose the underlying assumptions to be used. Final decisions on the
assumption to be used are to be made subject to the agreement of the Chairman of the AWG and
provided the principle of equal treatment across countries is respected at all times.
•   Fifth, national authorities will report projection results in a common reporting format to be
developed by the Commission.
The AWG plans to produce policy simulations regarding migration,
28 pension reforms (running
simulations on the impact of changes in indexation mechanisms, changes in effective retirement
ages and adjusting pension entitlements to life expectancy at retirement), health care and long-term
care (controlling costs in this field is likely to play an important role for the overall budgetary
performance), labour market developments and the Lisbon employment targets.
	 "	 – The joint projections exercises carried out by the
AWG represent an important step forward. First, they make sure that all EU countries regularly
produce pension expenditure projections. Second, the need to regularly update the projections, to
discuss them in a multinational context and to respect some agreed guidelines provides an incentive
to produce unbiased forecasts. Third, the common demographic and economic assumptions increase
the comparability of outcomes.
However, there are still a number of problems. Differences in modelling approaches, coverage of
projections and the significant margin left to national authorities to fix underlying economic
assumptions make the results not comparable in a strict sense. The information made public is often
not sufficient for a full assessment of the forecasting exercises and for conducting alternative
exercises. Moreover, the institutions assigned to make the projections are often those responsible for
designing social policy, which may affect both the availability and the substance of the forecasts,
and the information.
                                                
28 The simulations would assess the contribution of inward migration flows to offsetting some of the economic and
budgetary implications of ageing populations.17
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This section explores the potential role of PAYG pension liabilities in the EU fiscal framework. A
radical solution would imply assimilating pension liabilities to conventional public debt. This would
also require a change in the computation of the budget balance: social contributions would be
considered as loans to public pension schemes and pension spending as loan repayments.
#	
 $"    	( Any PAYG pension scheme gives rise to unfunded
liabilities.
29 Within these schemes each generation provides the resources for paying the pensions to
the previous generation and later receives pensions financed by younger workers. Therefore, at any
point in time there exist a number of retired citizens who are entitled to a pension for the remaining
part of their life (and sometimes also of the life of their widowed spouse) and a number of working
citizens who can claim a right to a pension either in the near or in the distant future.
There exist three main definitions of pension liabilities (Castellino, 1985; see also Box 4).
 -((: these represent the present value of pensions to be paid in the
future on the basis of accrued rights; neither the future contributions of existing workers, nor
the accrual of new rights by them are considered.
! ' ./  
0  : in this case it is assumed that pension
schemes continue their “existence until the last contributor dies, while no new entrants are
allowed”;
30 both the future contributions of existing members and their new rights are therefore
allowed for under current rules.
31
$ 1
(: these also include the present value of contributions and pensions
of new workers under current rules; the range of options extends from including only children
not yet in the labour force to an infinite perspective.
The three pension liabilities definitions share the pensioners’ liabilities component, but differ as to
the workers’ component. More specifically, the first definition includes only the present value of
accrued-to-date benefits of present workers. The second one also refers to the future benefits of
present workers and to their future contributions. The last definition also considers the benefits and
contributions of people who have not yet entered the labour market.
                                                
29 It is “a pension finance arrangement whereby current liabilities are met from current contributions, and no fund is
accumulated in advance to meet future needs” (Dilnot 	 1994, p. 212). The debt arises with the creation of the
PAYG pension scheme, when a generation of elderly citizens receives a pension without having paid any previous
contribution or when the contributions do not guarantee an adequate pension.
30 Van den Noord and Herd (1993).
31 This definition corresponds to the concept of “net social security wealth” developed by Feldstein (1974) and




This box formalises in an extremely simplified way the key equations for representing the three pension
liabilities definitions reported above. Disability pensions and survivor pension are not accounted for. It has
to be noted that the equations which follow should be considered as applying to each single pension scheme
existing in a country, since pension schemes usually have different features and rules (as to age, sex, wage,
contributory periods, etc.). The differentiation of rules for males and females is also not considered.
,%2((# Accrued-to-date liabilities () represent the present value of
pensions to be paid in the future on the basis of accrued rights. They include both present pensioners
liabilities (%) and present workers ones (').











where ( represents his pension in year , 
 represents his probability to be alive in year ,  is the discount
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where ) is the minimum pension age, 
3
) is the number of pensions paid to pensioners of age ) in year , () is
the average pension paid to pensioners of age ) in year  and 
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) is the probability to be alive in year  for
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where 
Z
) is the number of workers of age ) in year , (
Z
) is the average pension paid at retirement to
workers of age ) in year  computed on the basis of contributions already paid, *) is the probability of
receiving a pension at t for workers of age j in year t, 

Z
) is the probability to be alive in year  for a worker
of age ) in year 	19
,% 2   ./  
0   # These represent accrued-to-date
liabilities of workers and pensioners plus the present value of the rights present workers will acquire in the
future net of future contribution of present workers.
While accrued pensioners liabilities are as before, the workers component also takes into account the present
value of the rights that present workers will acquired in the future (WFB, workers’ future benefits) net of the

































=  t   i
t i
j i, j i,
 t   i
t i
w
j i, j i,
w
j




Y   R    C     
r 1
p 1
  S   Q   BF   N LW1(t)               
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where (+
Z
)is the average pension paid at retirement to workers of age ) in year  computed on the basis of
contributions to be paid in the future,  is the contributory rate on labour income, ,) is the probability of
working in year i for workers of age ) in year  and -) is the labour income in year  of a worker of age ) in
year .
,%2
(# These include the present value of accrued and future rights
of present workers and pensioners and the present value of pensions of new workers net of the present value
of their future contributions.
While accrued pensioners liabilities and the net liabilities concerning present workers is as in the second
definition of liabilities, one has also to consider the present value of the pensions of new workers (FWB,
future workers’ benefits) net of the present value of their future contributions (FWC, future workers’
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) is the number of children of age ) in year , (
F
) is the average pension paid at retirement to
children of age ) in year  computed on the basis of full working life, .) is the probability of receiving a
pension at t for children of age )in year , 

F
) is the probability to be alive in year  for a children of age ) in
year , 
F is the contributory rate on labour income, /) is the probability of working in year i for children of
age ) in year  and -
F
) is the labour income in year  of a children of age ) in year .
So overall (actual and future) workers’ liabilities under this definition are as follows:
  FWC(t)]     [FWB(t)      WFC(t)]   [WFB(t)     LW1(t)     LWN(t)   LW2(t)   LW3(t) − + − + = + =20
In other words, the last two definitions differ from the first one because they account also for new
expected net rights (of a closed and of an open system, respectively). Therefore, these indicators can
play a role in the assessment of the perspectives of pension schemes. Moreover, as new net pension
rights can be estimated for different generations of born and unborn citizens, they can be useful in
assessing the role of the public sector in determining the distribution of resources.
Estimates of pension liabilities require detailed information about the specific pension rules of each
country and about the features of workers and pensioners with respect to age, sex, wage and
contributory periods. These estimates depend on several assumptions on mortality rates, activity
rates, wage and price trends. The discount rate of future contributions and benefits play also a
crucial role. In addition, the last two definitions of pension liabilities require an assessment of the
expected value of future contributions.
32 In countries where pensions are included in the personal
income tax base, liabilities should be net of the presumed taxes levied on them.
33 This requires an
estimate of the average tax rate on pensions. In this regard, it has to be considered that even
assuming the stability of the present rate structure in real terms,
34 the average tax rate on pensions is
likely to change over time since the ratio of pension to other income may change. In countries where
public pension schemes are fully or partially funded, liabilities should be computed net of pension
fund assets.
#		-Among the three definitions of pension liabilities, that of accrued-to-date
liabilities is the only one that can be assimilated to conventional public debt.
Present pensioners and workers’ liabilities and open-system liabilities include pension rights that are
yet to accrue. Strictly speaking, these pension rights should not even be called liabilities, but
potential liabilities. They cannot therefore be assimilated to conventional public debt, which is a
backward looking statistic.
This section examines the indications provided by accrued liabilities and their possible role in the
EU fiscal framework.
                                                
32 In the case of public pension schemes, this may raise some methodological problems. In some countries current
pensions are fully financed by specific contributions to pension schemes. Future contributions can thus be assessed
on the basis of present contribution rates. In other countries current pensions are also financed via other sources,
such as general tax revenues and borrowing. In this latter case, if future contributions are assessed on the basis of
the contribution rate to pension schemes, there is a tendency to overestimate liabilities. The overestimation would
be particularly large for the countries relying mostly on general taxation. If, on the other hand, the relevant
contributory ratio is assumed equal to the pension-to-expenditure ratio in the base year, there is a tendency to
underestimate the imbalances of countries relying on borrowing. It would be better to try to assess future
contributions on the basis of the present contributory rate to pension schemes plus present recourse to general
taxation. In other words, present recourse to borrowing should be excluded from estimates of future contributions.
However, also this method would involve some arbitrary assumptions.
33 No such adjustment is necessary for conventional public debt, since no tax is levied on public bonds when they are
refunded.
34 Tax rates are adjusted to income changes in order to keep the tax to income ratio constant.21
#		
%& 	#The information that pension
liabilities provide can be better understood by considering two stylised cases: the first takes a macro
perspective; the second case takes a micro perspective and highlights the effects of demographic
changes. The former is considered in what follows; the latter is analysed in Box 5, where also a
numerical example is considered.
Let us consider a steady state situation where the ratio of any expenditure to GDP is constant over
time. Suppose there are two countries (A and B) in which, , PAYG pension spending
is respectively 0 and 0 per cent of GDP (where >1). Overall public spending is the same in both
countries because country A devotes #1&0 per cent of GDP more spending than country B to non-
pension spending programmes. Country A and country B devote on a permanent basis revenues
amounting respectively to 0 and 0 of GDP to their PAYG schemes. In the steady state, the ratio of
accrued-to-date liabilities to GDP is given by the discounted value of the ratios of future pension
spending to GDP and so the latter is proportional to pension spending as a share of GDP. This
means that, notwithstanding the same underlying sustainability circumstances, country B pension
liabilities are  times those of country A.
Therefore, the size of unfunded pension liabilities does not indicate that PAYG systems are
unbalanced or will be unbalanced in the future. The matter should be rather judged in terms of the
efficiency of PAYG schemes and their role in achieving society’s equity objectives.
Overall, both the example which considers the economy from the macro perspective and (23
make it clear that the ratio of accrued pension liabilities to GDP is not a measure of pension
schemes sustainability or, more generally, of public finances sustainability. A high liabilities-to-
GDP ratio does not necessarily imply an imbalance in the PAYG pension schemes or in the budget.
Nor does it imply that an imbalance will occur in the future. The size of the liabilities depends on
the decision concerning the benefits and eligibility criteria of PAYG schemes, but it does not
provide any information on whether the PAYG system is unbalanced or will be unbalanced in the
future.
Any judgement about the sustainability of pension schemes requires estimates about the resources
available to pay for the accrued pensions, namely about the evolution of employment and per capita
income. Accrued-to-date liabilities do not include such estimates. All one can say is that the larger
the ratio of pension rights to GDP, the higher the share of future public resources committed to
pension expenditure and the higher the risk that, if GDP growth is not adequate, some adjustment
will become necessary (in terms of higher tax rates, of repudiation of pension rights, etc.). Some




We consider a very simplified economy in the steady state with a constant population structure. We show
that the ratios to GDP of both accrued liabilities and pension expenditure are constant over time. As long as
the contributory rate is higher than the expenditure ratio this system is sustainable.
We then introduce a demographic shock in the system. The shock will be such that the ratio of liabilities to
GDP will be the same as before, but the expenditure ratio will increase over time till above the contributory
rate. Therefore, the shock will lead the system to be unbalanced.
This means that, for a given ratio of accrued-to-date liabilities to GDP, a country can be on either a
sustainable or an unsustainable path.
,%# Assume that the interest rate is equal to the rate of growth of the amount paid to each
pensioner (which is constant so that discounting cancels out). Moreover, assume that pensions accrue at a
constant rate during working years (each worker accrues a fraction of the pension  which is inversely
proportional to the expected length of the retirement period). GDP is given by the sum of workers’ product
(which coincide with their wage 4).
The timing in such an economy is as follows: individuals do not work until they reach a certain age '
(working age), then they work till they reach age , (retirement age) and they benefit from a pension till
they reach age $ (death age). This timing is the same for every individual. Population does not grow over
time: the birth rate and the death rate are the same so that the number of pensioners and that of workers are
both constant over time.
The ratio of accrued-to-date pension liabilities to GDP at time t is as follows (see (25 and take into




















  RA) (DA
WA) (RA 
 WA)   (b
N   a) (DA N
w
p
           
w N
p   RA) (DA
WA) (RA 
 WA)   (b
N p   a) (DA N
            
 
Y(t)
LW1(t)     LP(t)





























This means that the ratio of accrued-to-date pension liabilities to GDP at time t is given by the ratio of the
average per capita benefit to the average per capita wage (which is also the average per capita GDP) times
the ratio to the number of workers of the sum of the number of pensioners, weighted for their life
expectancy, and the number of workers, weighted for their expected life as pensioners times their share of
working life already worked. Given the assumptions on the demographic developments of this economy this
ratio is constant over time and depends on the decision concerning the retirement age. The higher RA is, the
smaller the pension liabilities are.23
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As long as the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP is less than or equal to the contributory rate  (constant),
the system is balanced.
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So the ratio between liabilities and pension expenditure does not depend either on the average pension or on
the average wage. It depends on the ratio to the number of pensioners of the sum of the number of
pensioners, weighted for their life expectancy, and the number of workers, weighted for their expected life
as pensioners times their share of working life already worked. Basically, for any given p/w, the ratio
depends on the structure of population.
,%%/# Suppose that a “demographic shock” occurs: there are more workers than in the steady state
(the baby-boom generation enters the labour force). Assume that this increase in the workforce does not
change the accrued-to-date liabilities to GDP. This is possible as long as the new workers imply a
proportional increase in accrued liabilities and in overall gross domestic product. If the demographic shock
implies an increase in the number of just-entered workers (i.e. an increase in the number of workers of age
WA +1) then, given that in the steady state the number of workers of age WA+1 was  1 WA N + , after the shock
the number of workers of age WA+1 is 
’
1 WA N +  where  1 WA
’
1 WA  N + + =  and  1 > . Therefore, after the
shock the ratio of accrued liabilities to GDP can be written as follows:
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where  refers to the period when the shock occurs and L and Y are the steady state values of liabilities and


















where 6 is a positive constant, then the increase in the workforce leaves the ratio of accrued liabilities to
GDP unchanged. Obviously there is an infinite number of 6 values for which the system is satisfied.
Moreover, the system is satisfied (i.e. the demographic shock can leave the liabilities-to-GDP ratio
unchanged) as long as the ratio of the retirement period to the working period, weighted by the ratio of the
average pension to the average wage, is equal to that of the steady state liability-to-GDP ratio:
Y
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In the shock-period the system is still balanced. Indeed, the pension expenditure ratio to GDP is lower than
in the steady state (the number of pensioners is the same as before while GDP is higher) while the
contributory rate is as before.
Nevertheless over time, as the baby-boom generation retires (i.e. at time  &7 #' 8,  1 + − + , the system
will be unbalanced. Indeed at that time, while GDP will return to the steady state value, the pension
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V & # is the number of baby-boom pensioners, i.e. the
additional workers as compared to the steady state which were in the labour force at the time the shock 
occurred). As  is not likely to be high enough, the system will be unbalanced, i.e. the pension expenditure















p   ] 1)N - ( [N
) Y(
) 1 P(







Therefore, the ratio of accrued liabilities to GDP does not imply anything in terms of sustainability: the
steady state economy and the after-shock economy share the same liability-to-GDP ratio but completely
different perspectives in terms of sustainability of the pension system.
-	
# Suppose we have a steady state economy with the following population structure.
There are four citizens: one is 10 years old, one is 30, one is 50, and one is 70. Assume that every citizen
works from age 20 to age 60 so that the second and the third citizens work; their gross income is  	
The oldest citizen is retired; his pension is  
	
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GDP, is 20 per cent. Assume that incomes and pensions grow at a constant rate and that this rate is equal to
the interest rate.
35 Also assume that pensions accrue at a constant rate during working years (with a present
value of  #$&#!&'#	
The retired citizen accrued rights amount at  
( 
#%)
accrued rights amount to  '( #%!!! *
times 20 years for the second worker). Altogether, pension liabilities amount to 6 times GDP. As the
contributory rate is set to remain stable at 20 per cent and the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP is not
going to exceed 20 per cent over time, the system is balanced.
                                                
35 In many countries pensions are indexed to price dynamics. Therefore, the assumption that relates them to wage
dynamics tends to overestimate pension expenditure. On the other hand, in many countries there are rules that work
the opposite way. For instance, pensions are frequently based on the wages earned in the latter part of working life,
which are often higher than the average real wage earned during the whole life.25
Now, suppose that there is a demographic shock: the baby boom generation enters the labour market so that
the economy is as before, but there are two more people. More specifically, workers aged 50 are now three.
Pension liabilities and GDP are, respectively,  	
( *#%!!
two in addition to the previous  	! 
(!)"!$
as in the steady state, equal to 6. Pension expenditure is presently 10 per cent of GDP but in 10-years time it
will rise to 60 per cent and become unsustainable, given the 20 per cent contributory rate.
Therefore the steady state economy and the post-shock economy share the same accrued-to-date liabilities
(which are 6 times GDP) but they are very different in terms of sustainability, i.e. perspective pension
developments which depend on their demographic structure.
It can also be argued that a country relying only on PAYG schemes can be in a worse position than a
country relying both on PAYG and funded schemes in terms of risk differentiation and the
absorption of shocks. However, neither theory nor experience support the view that the recourse to
PAYG schemes rather than to funded schemes necessarily implies less sound public finances.
36
On the other hand, accrued rights measure the cost of closing down a PAYG scheme when fully
complying with present rules concerning benefits:
37 if there is a switch from a PAYG system to a
funded system and all new contributions are paid into the new system, accrued rights measure the
amount of resources which have to be financed out of general taxation.
#			#With reference to accrued-to-date liabilities, it can be
argued that “from the worker’s point of view, social security “tax” contributions are, in most
respects, equivalent to the purchase of a government liability” (Kotlikoff, 1984; p. 567). In fact, an
abrupt end to or a radical change in a PAYG scheme would impose large adjustment costs and
personal hardships to pensioners and workers who have taken their savings and labour supply
decisions on the basis of the existence of the scheme.
38
Nevertheless, accrued pension rights differ in many ways from conventional public debt (see also
Rizzo, 1985, Pedone, 1987 and Bohn, 1992).
                                                
36 The PAYG versus funding argument is very complex and is beyond the scope of this paper. See, for instance, the
papers in OECD (1992) and Sartor (1993).
37 See World Bank (1994).
38 According to Bohn (1992, p. 4), “One should distinguish between a social-security system in its start-up phase,
where the first generation of participants receive substantial ”unearned” benefits, and a more mature system. Since
promises to make gift are generally unenforceable, the benefits promised in the start-up phase cannot be considered
government liabilities. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine that a government could cancel the social-
security benefits of retirees who have made social security contributions throughout their life.” This distinction,
although appealing, is not easily applied.26
First of all, while the timing of the repayment of public bonds as well as the amount to be paid to
the holders are fixed in advance, those of pension liabilities are .
39 Indeed, they depend on
decisions made by the holders of the entitlements (concerning, for instance, the age of retirement,
where some flexibility is allowed) and on various types of events (those concerning the length of
life, wage and price dynamics, etc.).
40
Second, pension rights are . The debtor can modify both the timing
and the amount of the payment. While failure to repay financial liabilities may give rise to legal
claims and political reactions, the repudiation of PAYG pension liabilities may raise only the
latter.
41 Pension liabilities can be reduced by changing benefit rules: major pension reforms have
reduced the future entitlements of current workers and pensioners. Indexation mechanisms,
retirement ages, eligibility rules and other aspects of the pension system have been frequently
modified in recent years in developed countries.
42 Consequently it would be erroneous to assume
that pension programs represent a firm legal or moral commitment.
43
Moreover, while public bonds are usually bought freely on the market by individuals or companies,
the acquisition of pension rights is usually . This means that a large pension-debt does
not determine any direct pressure on the financial markets.
44 It also implies that the debt is
automatically renewed.
Finally, pension rights are . This implies that changes in the relative yield and the
relative risk of pension rights comparatively to other assets have no effect on financial markets. It
also implies less protection for pension-right holders than for bond holders. Bohn (1992, p. 45)
notes that: “For government debt, any attempt to default – outright or through inflation – would
imply undesirable market disruptions. Such “protection” against default does not exist for social-
security claims. In addition, non tradability implies that social-security claims could be altered
selectively, taking individual characteristics (e.g., income, demographics) into account.”
                                                
39 For a general analysis of government contingent liabilities see Towe (1991).
40 The elasticity of pensions to price and wage changes is frequently different from 1.
41 On the political-economy of support to pension expenditure see Buchanan (1983), Rizzo (1985) and Tabellini
(1990).
42 The Italian pension reform of 1992 provides a clear case: 30 per cent of the pension-debt was wiped out at a time
when public finances were considered to be in a very critical situation.
43 One should nevertheless consider that the implementation of large cuts in pension rights may obviously raise
political reactions and that these reactions are likely to increase with the gradual shift of political power towards
the older generations. As Börsh-Supan (1991, pp; 129-130) notes: “In West Germany after 2020 the majority of the
voters will be pensioners and workers who will become retired within the next 10 years. We then risk facing a
typical free-rider situation as the older generation can outvote the younger generation in determining their
retirement income as well as the rate of social security taxes the younger generation has to pay.”
44 A large future pension expenditure may obviously influence the attitude towards public bonds, but this is an
indirect effect.27
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#The previous Sub-section has pointed to the differences between accrued pension liabilities and
public debt. In the EMU framework the inclusion of pension liabilities in the public debt definition
would raise additional problems.
First, conventional public debt can be measured rather precisely and unambiguously at any point in
time. Pension liabilities are uncertain and depend on the specific assumptions adopted upon a
variety of factors, such as life expectancy, price and wage trends. Present value calculations are
extremely sensitive to changes in assumptions.
45 This is particularly problematic in a context where
figures are to be provided for 25 countries.
Second, as pension rights are acquired compulsorily and are not tradable, they produce no direct
effect on financial markets. The inclusion of pension liabilities in the debt and deficit measures
would obscure the pressure of the public sector on financial markets.
46
Third, the inclusion of pension liabilities in the public debt definition would either require an
analogous change in the deficit definition or enlarge the degree of incoherence between the two
indicators European fiscal rules refer to. Let us consider the first case. Currently contributions are
recorded as government revenue and pensions as payments to retirees. The change would imply that
contributions are classified as loans to the public sector, which would not be taken into account in
computing the deficit indicator (Oksanen, 2004). Pensions would be considered as loan repayment.
In this accounting system, an increase in contribution rates would, , have no effect
either on current or future deficits.
47 Any increase in the benefits promised for the future would
increase current deficit and leave future ones unchanged. These changes would blur any indications
concerning the impact of the fiscal policies of each country on the area fiscal stance. Although
pension liabilities surely affect consumption and saving decisions,
48 the magnitude of the impact is
not necessarily equal to that of public financial liabilities. Pension rights holders may have limited
foresight, may not trust present or future government’s capacity to deliver the full pensions they are
entitled to under present rules, may be cash-constrained, may live in a world with imperfect capital
                                                
45 As Boskin 	 (1987, p. 45) point out, referring to the USA: “Moving all of the economic and demographic
projections from intermediate to either optimistic or pessimistic (assumptions) results in a change which is larger
than the privately held national debt.” The effects on deficit estimates would even be relatively larger.
46 The case of Italy may again be relevant. Despite the fact that the 1992 reform wiped out pension liabilities equal to
Italian conventional debt, the role of the public sector in the financial markets have not changed significantly.
47 It has also been suggested that part of the repayment be considered an implicit interest payment. This solution is
supported by Kotlikoff (1984). Towe (1991, p. 117) notes that “proponents of this system do not address the issue
of decomposing benefit payments into “principal” and “interest”. Presumably, actuarial criteria could be applied.”
In this case, the impact of changes in current contribution rates would depend on the link between contributions
and benefits.
48 As to savings, see for instance Rossi and Visco (1994) who suggest that the growth of PAYG schemes’ liabilities
contributed substantially to the decline in Italian saving ratio between the 1960s and the 1980s.28
markets. The inclusion of pension rights in debt and deficit statistics on a one-to-one basis might,
therefore, lead to an erroneous estimate of the impact of fiscal policy.
49
Fourth, the addition of pension liabilities to the conventional public debt would produce misleading
indications of the effects of changes in interest rates on public expenditure perspectives and
budgetary sustainability. Since accrued pension liabilities are negatively related to the level of the
interest rate, any increase in this level would automatically reduce total debt. This development can
look like an improvement however it might correspond to an actual worsening of budgetary
conditions due to the increase in interest expenditure.
Fifth, the inclusion of pension liabilities in debt and deficit statistics would obviously influence
international comparisons of public finance data. The amount of the total public debt would depend
on the structure of the pension system. More specifically, the countries relying on PAYG schemes
would record a higher debt than those relying on funding. But one can wonder why pension
expenditure should be treated differently as compared to other types of expenditure. To some extent,
all spending programmes create implicit contracts containing future liabilities. On this point Brittan
(1993) takes a radical view: “The fallacy of such estimates (of pension liabilities) is to treat pension
commitments differently from other forms of public spending. The PAYG schemes, from which the
scare stories stem, are based on each generation of workers paying through taxes and contributions
sufficient to cover the cost of pensions for those already retired. Thus, pensions are, like any other
form of rising public expenditure, to be met from higher tax revenue or social security contributions,
or reduced spending elsewhere.”
50
Finally, the inclusion of pension liabilities in the public debt definition, by making citizens’
entitlements more explicit, might produce negative effects on the pension reforms needed to ensure
fiscal sustainability in several European countries.
51
#	)"%& # Present pensioners and workers’
liabilities and open-system liabilities include net pension rights that are yet to accrue. Strictly
speaking, these pension rights should not even be called liabilities but potential liabilities. They
cannot therefore be in any way assimilated to conventional public debt, which is a backward looking
indicator.
                                                
49 This point is extensively examined in Mackenzie (1989).
50 Penner (1982, p. 234) notes that: “One might argue that the degree of political commitment to future pensions is
somewhat stronger than to other entitlements in that pension benefits seem much harder to cut than other
entitlements. But neither are cut very often, and this is admittedly a weak argument.” See also Kuné (1996).
51 Boskin (1982) notes that: “I would not wish to have the current rules and regulations of the social insurance
program cemented into a unified capital account of the government as if we had issued explicit long-term
contractual debt obligations, that is, I do not want to enshrine pay-as-you-go financing of these programs and
government activities at current projected levels.”29
As already mentioned, new expected rights may play a role in the assessment of the perspectives of
pension schemes. Future rights are positive when the discounted flow of benefits is higher than the
discounted flow of contributions; they are negative when the former flow is smaller than the latter.
We now turn to the possible economic and sustainability implications of positive and negative net
future rights.
In a “pure” PAYG system in any period the total amount of pensions paid out is given by the total
amount of contributions:
w P N    w c     N   p =
where  is the average pension, 
3   represents the number of pensioners, is the contribution rate
levied on wages, 4 is the average wage and 
Z  represents the number of workers.
If  is constant over time, 4, 
3   and 
Z  dynamics are exogenous and  is adjusted in each period
of time in order to balance expenditures with revenues (i.e. there is a “pure” PAYG system), it can
be shown that the rate of return on contributions () is approximately equal to the sum of the rates
of growth of per capita wages (
•




          w
• •
+ =  4 
To grasp the intuition underlying this result, think of a two-period economy. In the first period
individuals work and pay contributions. In the second period individuals get a pension. Overall
pension expenditure in each period is equal to the contributions paid in the same period by the
generation which is currently working. Pensioners get a pension which depends on the number of
working individuals and on the wage of those individuals. Therefore, the return on the contributions
paid in the previous period by today’s pensioners depends on the growth rate of the number of
workers and on the growth rate of wages.
A “pure” PAYG pension policy is sustainable, in the sense that it does not require any change in
rules, as long as  w        
• •
+ =  4  .
In practice, most PAYG systems are not “pure” systems, i.e.  is not adjusted in each period of time
in order to balance expenditures with revenues. In other words,  is not necessarily equal to
w    
• •
+  4 .
Net pension rights are positive if the implicit return on contribution is greater than the return rate
assumed as a benchmark (i.e. if       > ) but the sign of net pension rights does not convey any
information on whether or not there is an imbalance in the PAYG scheme. The amount of pension
rights does not provide any information on whether the rate of return on contributions is either
larger or smaller then the sum of the rate of growth of per capita wages and of the rate of growth of
                                                
52 See Aaron (1966).30
the number of workers (i.e. whether            w
• •
+ >  4   or            w
• •
+ <  4  ) which is the relevant aspect in
assessing the need to modify pension policy.
The sign and the dimension of pension rights crucially depend on the choice of , which is rather
arbitrary. If  is very high, even a scheme where  is much higher than  w    
• •
+  4  would show
negative net rights. Conversely, if  is very low, even a scheme where is much lower than  w    
• •
+  4
would show positive net rights.
In conclusion, positive net rights do not imply that the pension system is presently unbalanced in
cash terms or that it will become unbalanced within a certain time. Neither do they imply that some
adjustment will have to take place in the future. On the other hand, there may exist circumstances in
which even with null or negative new expected rights the pension system can exert large cash
pressure on the budget.
It would be more relevant to provide estimates of  and to compare them with present and future
values of  w    
• •
+  4  (this is precisely the indication provided by the equilibrium contributory rate).
Unless one assumes that a certain rate of return on contributions represents a normative benchmark
for the assessment of PAYG schemes, any comparison between  and an arbitrary r does not lead
very far.
Had estimates of new net rights been carried out in the 1960s and the 1970s, they would have
probably shown large positive values because  was in many countries higher than it is now. The
large positive values would have implicitly signalled that citizens were granted very high returns on
contributions and that these returns were unlikely to be continuously matched by a high level of
w    
• •
+  4 . The availability and the diffusion of estimates might have limited the tendency to improve
pension benefits and might have accelerated the reform of pension schemes. Recent estimates, that
take the reforms of the 1980s and the 1990s into account, are apparently less worrying. Van den
Noord and Herd (1993) record negative or nearly null new net rights in four out of the seven
countries that they consider. In spite of that, due to the decline in  w    
• •
+  4 , the situation of pension
systems is very worrying: a declining number of new workers is being called to service a large
accrued debt.
In a way, estimates of future net rights were not available when they were mostly needed. Now that
they are available, it is apparent that in many countries the problem does not lie in avoiding that
future net rights have positive values but in cutting accrued rights and in getting new generations of
workers to accept negative net rights.
#	# 	!Estimates of pension liabilities are subject to measurement
errors and to misinterpretation, as the projections for pension expenditure. They are based on
specific assumptions concerning a variety of factors, such as future labour force participation rates,
retirement behaviour, unemployment, prices and earnings. As for demographic calculations,
forecasts rely on techniques for projecting future pension payments from available data on current31
and past trends. Estimates can be based on administrative data concerning the work history of
individuals or on panel data tracking the economic activity of successive cohorts of individuals.
The first international comparisons of pension liabilities were provided in 1989 by Hagemann and
Nicoletti and in 1993 by Van den Noord and Herd and by Kuné . The first and the second works
were prepared within the OECD, the third within ABP.
53 Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) refer to
pension scheme accounts in 1985; the other authors refer to 1990 accounts. The countries
considered do not coincide. Only Germany is considered in all three papers. Before examining the
data, however, it is necessary to consider some methodological issues.
The studies are based on a highly simplified methodology. In Van den Noord and Herd (1993), for
each country a “full pension” (which is actually an average pension) is computed dividing total
public expenditure on pensions by the number of beneficiaries. The present value of current benefits
is estimated on the basis of the full pension, of mortality rates and of a discount rate. Pensions are
supposed to be held constant in real terms. The paper shows that estimated pension liabilities on
average are about twice as large as conventional debt; future pension rights are projected to generate
liabilities amounting to 3.5 times the GDP, almost twice as much as the level of liabilities
associated with existing entitlements. Furthermore, countries with high debt-to-GDP ratio also tend
to have high pension liabilities to GDP ratio.
In estimating the pension rights of current workers, Van den Noord and Herd (1993) assume that in
each country the standard retirement age is 60, and the number of years of contributions required for
a full pension
54 is 40. They also assume that pension entitlements accrue at a constant rate of 1/8 of
the full pension every five-contribution years. Present workers are grouped in eight five-year
brackets. The members of each bracket are assumed to be entitled to the same pension rights.
During working life, pension entitlements are projected to grow at the same rate as projected real
earnings and real output per worker. This means that the ratio of the average new pension to real
earnings per worker is held constant. An exception is made for Canada and the United Kingdom
“where pension rates undergo a structural upgrading”.
55
Kuné . (1993) follow broadly the same lines. Standard retirement age is nevertheless assumed
to be 65, and no structural upgrading is considered. In Van den Noord and Herd (1993) the different
PAYG schemes existing in each country are considered as a single “average” system; in Kuné .
(1993) the present value of pension rights is estimated separately for public sector and private sector
workers.
                                                
53 ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) is the pension fund of the Dutch public employees. The paper was
prepared for CEPS Working Party on “Financing Retirement Provision in Europe”.
54 That is for a pension equal to the 1990 average pension.
55 Structural upgrading may depend on younger generations of citizens retiring with longer contributory periods or
with more favourable rules concerning the determination of the pension paid.32
In Van den Noord and Herd (1993) the discount rate is 4 per cent in real terms in the period 1990-
2010; after that, it gradually declines reaching 3 per cent in 2050. An alternative projection with a
discount rate 1.5 per cent higher than in the baseline is also presented. In Hagemann and Nicoletti
(1989) the discount rate is set at 2 per cent for Germany, Sweden and the US and at 3.5 per cent for
Japan. In Kuné 	 (1993) the discount rate is 4 per cent for the whole projection period.
In all the papers some assumptions are clearly unsatisfactory.
•   In many countries younger pensioners, who obviously live longer, receive, on average, higher
pensions than older ones. The assumption that pension level is uniform tends to underestimate
the present value of current pensioners’ rights. Besides, the use of the current average pension as
the term of reference for the level of future pensions may lead to erroneous estimates. Estimates
may turn out too low if pension levels undergo a structural upgrading, and too high if rules
concerning the level of new pensions have been tightened.
•   In some countries (like Germany and Italy up to 1992) pensions are also indexed to real wage
increases. Holding pensions constant in real terms determines an underestimate of liabilities.
56
•   Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) and Van den Noord and Herd (1993) do not provide separate
estimates for public and private sector workers. This may lead to some underestimation of
liabilities since in many countries in the last decades public employment has grown faster than
total employment, and public employees usually have better retirement rules.
•   Kuné . do not take into account that some pension systems may not yet have reached
maturity (i.e., that the ratio of average new pensions to average earnings may increase over
time). Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) consider structural upgrading for Japan and Sweden. Van
den Noord and Herd (1993) consider it for Canada and the UK.
57
Table 2 presents the estimates of accrued pension liabilities according to Van den Noord and Herd
(1993) and Kuné  (1993). The data concerning the four major EU Member States show that
estimates vary considerably: UK’s liability ranges between 42 and 139 per cent of GDP, France’s
between 69 and 216. Van den Noord and Herd (1993) provide the highest estimates and Kuné .
(1993) the lowest. The ranking of the four countries is very different: Germany comes first
according to Kuné 	 (1993) and third according to Van den Noord and Herd (1993).
                                                
56 Van den Noord and Herd (1994) provide an estimate of the pension liabilities of the seven major western countries
under the assumption that all pension benefits after retirement are indexed to earnings. Accrued pension liabilities
are 10 to 20 per cent higher than in the case of price indexation.
57 As regards Italy, for instance, only one third of the increase in the ratio of public pension expenditure to GDP
between 1960 and 1990 may be attributed to demographic changes (Franco, 1993). The increase in the pension to








Country Gross Liabilities Existing Net Gross liabilities




Belgium 30 38 68
Denmark 0 69 69
Germany 54 103 157 - 157 50 72 122
Greece 16 102 118
Spain 13 96 109
France 77 139 216 - 216 31 38 69
Ireland 84 6 5 4
Italy** 94 148 242 - 242 29 78 107
(94) (165) (259) (259)
Luxembourg 25 113 138
Netherlands 0 137 137
Portugal 16 80 96
UK 58 81 139 - 139 0 42 42
USA 42 70 113 23 89
Japan 51 112 163 18 144
Canada 42 71 113 8 105
Source: Franco (1995).
* Data for Canada and the UK have been updated as in Van den Noord-Herd (1994).
**  Figures in brackets are estimates of liabilities before the 1992 pension reform.
Furthermore, in the by estimates Van den Noord and Herd (1993), pensioners’ rights represent 30 to
40 per cent of total rights. In the estimates by Kuné 	 (1993), civil servants’ rights represent 40
per cent of total pension rights in Belgium, Germany and France. It is a much higher percentage
than their incidence in the labour force. This supports the view that pension liabilities ought to be
estimated separately for all the major schemes with different rules existing in any country.
Table 3 shows some estimates of current workers and pensioners’ net liabilities and open-system net
















































































































































































































































Belgium 68 44 112
Denmark 69 28 97
Germany 355 157 –8 –2 13 160 122 57 179
Greece 118 78 196
Spain 109 74 183
France 216 –16 –7 23 216 69 37 106
Ireland 54 49 103
Italy *** 242 –60 –36 –45 101 107 77 184
(259) (–22) (–11) (8) (223)
Luxembourg 138 99 237
Netherlands 137 73 210
Portugal 96 71 167
UK 139 –23 –12 –3 100 42 28 70
USA 158 112 –21 –14 –11 66
Japan 217 163 10 8 38 218
Canada 105 16 14 57 191
* Percent of 1985 GDP. Swedish liabilities are estimated as 183 or 228 percent of GDP according to pension indexation to prices or to wages.
** Data for Canada and the UK have been updated as in Van den Noord-Herd (1994).
*** Figures in brackets are estimates of liabilities before the 1992 pension reform.35
contributions to PAYG schemes. This tends to overestimate pension liabilities. Van den Noord and
Herd (1993) assume that in five of the seven countries considered, contributions to PAYG schemes
are going to be equal, with respect to GDP, to the incidence of their expenditure on GDP in 1990.
58
This means that no part of 1990 public budget deficits is attributed to public pension schemes.
There follows an underestimation of future liabilities of pension schemes. For the two remaining
countries, contributions are computed at present rates. The latter methodology is also applied by
Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989).
59
Van den Noord and Herd (1993) provide estimates regarding present workers, children not yet in the
workforce and unborn citizens. According to the paper, “A positive number in such an account
implies a net debt of the government to a specific generation, and hence a net transfer of wealth to
that generation. Similarly, a negative number represents a net debt of a particular generation to the
government and hence a net transfer of wealth to that generation”.
60
According to these estimates, in Canada and Japan rights for new generations are accruing faster
than contributions. Some adjustment to contribution rates or benefit rules would therefore be
necessary in order to avoid new transfers of resources to pensioners. In France and Germany
“accruals of contributions would broadly match new accruals of pension rights (while leaving the
existing accruals unfinanced)”.
61 In Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States future
generations have already “been called to transfer wealth to current generations”. This does not imply
that in the latter countries there is scope for improving benefits or for cutting contribution rates.
Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) provides an estimate of the unfunded pension liabilities of all
individuals aged 17 to 90 years in 1985. Its results should be comparable with the sum of Van den
Noord and Herd (1993) accrued rights and new net rights of the present workforce. Again, the
estimates differ very much: 355 per cent of GDP in Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) as against 149
per cent in Van den Noord and Herd (1993) for Germany, 158 per cent as against 91 per cent for the
USA, 217 per cent as against 173 per cent for Japan (Table 3). A part of the difference surely
depends on the assumptions about the discount rate. In the case of Germany it may also depend on
the different methodologies used in estimating future contributions.
The different solutions adopted by Van den Noord and Herd (1993) and Kuné . (1993) for
evaluating future contributions also explain the different results in Table 2 and Table 3.
                                                
58 The countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.
59 As to the USA, legislated future increases contribution rates are taken into account.
60 OECD (1993, p. 54).
61 But this would not matter as long as the PAYG systems were not terminated.36
Table 4 reports the results of some estimates of pension liabilities carried out at national level in
more analytical terms.
62  UK and Italian estimates are rather larger than those presented in Tables 2
and 3.
63 In the case of Italy there is a huge difference in the estimates of liabilities existing before
the 1992 pension reform and in the estimates of the effects of the reform. Van den Noord and Herd
(1993) results concerning Italy, which also contrast with those of other studies concerning the
perspectives of the Italian pension system,
64 depend largely on the overestimation of future
contribution and on the underestimation of benefits arising from the assumption considered above.
National studies show that in some countries the ratio of pension liabilities to GDP has grown
considerably during the last decades; accordingly, in these countries, economic deficits have been
much larger than conventional cash flow deficits. The inclusion of the change in liabilities in deficit
statistics would have increased the Italian deficit by 11 points of GDP every year between 1971 and
1981 and by 5 points every year between 1981 and 1991.
Chand and Jaeger (1996) estimate discounted net pension liabilities, defined as current accrued
rights of pensioners and workers plus the prospective liabilities that will be accumulated in the
future. Furthermore, the paper estimates the primary balance required to finance these projected
pension liabilities (Table 5).
According to the paper, net pension liabilities range from 5 per cent of GDP for the United
Kingdom to about 110 per cent of GDP for France, Germany and Japan. The authors add these
liabilities to the net public debt and argue that if “one judges the sustainability of a nation’s fiscal
stance in terms of the conventional criterion of stabilising net public debt at its current levels, it
would appear that the present fiscal stance of Italy and Germany are sustainable: their projected
primary balances in 1995 exceed the amounts needed to stabilise the ratio of net public debt
(excluding pension liabilities) to GDP”. Given that the assumed interest rates are higher than
projected real growth rates, primary surplus has to be high enough to offset the growth in debt ratio
due to interest rates. “However, if account is taken of the projected buildup in net pension debt, and
the sustainability criterion is modified to include as well the prevention of any buildup of pension
debts, primary surpluses would have to be even higher”.
Disney (2001) criticises the methodology adopted by Chand and Jaeger because they put together
calculations on an accrual basis (column 1) with projections (column 2) and cash flows (column 3).
The projected net liabilities incorporate future flows of contributions that will generate further
                                                
62 Some papers providing estimates for Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia and Turkey are indicated in World Bank
(1994).
63 The gross liabilities of Italian pension schemes have been estimated also in Pench (1993), which discounts the flow
of expected pension expenditure up to the year 2025. The paper aims at evaluating the permanent (seignorage-
adjusted) primary surplus excluding pensions required to ensure fiscal policy sustainability; for that reason it does
not deduct future contributions from future expenditure.
64 INPS (1993), Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (1994), Castellino (1994).37
liabilities. Moreover, instead of solving for the equilibrium PAYG contribution rate required to
finance future expenditures, the rate is arbitrarily fixed at its current level, which may not be
sustainable. This generates an arbitrary net pension liability, which is then added to an existing one
(net public debt). Finally, the “sustainable” primary balance is added to a cash flow measure (the
current budget balance) to generate a fiscal adjustment. On the contrary, Disney suggests a different
method consisting in starting with the net public debt and add to it a net pension liability based on
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Italy Castellino 1985 L1 317 1983




Beltrametti 1994 L2 389 (1) 1992
L2 278 (2) 1992
USA Feldstein 1974 L2 71 1960
111 1970
Bohn 1992 L1 50-90(3) 1989
+ 27 (4)
UK Hills 1984 L1 198/214 1982
Before 1992 pension reform. – (2) After 1992 pension reform. – (3) Social Security. – (4) Civil Service and Military.
L1 = Accrued to date liabilities.
































 United States 63.3 25.7 1.9 0.4 1.5
 Japan 33.2 106.8 3.6 –0.2 3.8
 Germany 52.5 110.7 4.5 2.4 2.1
 France 42.4 113.6 4.0 –0.3 4.3
 Italy 112.9 75.5 4.6 3.3 1.3
 UK 37.7 4.6 0.8 0.4 0.4
 Canada 71.6 67.8 4.7 0.2 4.5
 Sweden 54.5 20.4 1.0 –5.1 6.1
Source: Chand and Jaeger (1996).
(A) Adjusted for net assets of public pension funds at the end of 1994. Estimate of net public det for Germany includes unification debt as of the end
of 1994.
(B) Net present value of difference between projected primary expenditure and revenue of public pension fund during 1995-2050, adjusted for net
asset position of public pension systems at the end of 1994.
Frederiksen (2001) aims at estimating the immediate and permanent adjustment of the primary
surplus required to forestall the need for further future changes of fiscal policy. He follows two
approaches. The first one consists in a comparison between the actual pattern of fiscal consolidation
(basically, the actual structural deficit) and the required pattern of consolidation. The latter reflect
the need to offset the projected future decrease in the primary surplus due to greater age related
spending, as estimated by the AWG.
In the second approach, Frederiksen compares the actual structural primary surplus with the
“required” primary surplus. The latter is measured estimating the interest burden both on the explicit
net debt and on the implicit debt reflecting the future budgetary consequences of current legislation.
In 2000, in the nineteen countries considered the ratio of government net explicit liabilities to GDP
amounted on average to 46 per cent. The implicit liabilities amounted to 194 per cent of GDP. This39
implies that, according to OECD estimates, the “official” net debt amounted to only one-fifth of the
effective debt burden.
In principle, the two approaches should give the same results to the extent that the assumed constant
interest rate is a good proxy of the return on current government financial assets and liabilities.
65
The average improvement of the primary balance required for the nineteen countries is actually the
same (2.3 per cent of GDP) but there are some significant differences at the country level.
Frederiksen (2001) reports the changes in the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio and the total
amount of implicit liabilities (which are based on the open system methodology). The relative
position of most countries remains the same either when countries are ranked on the basis of the
changes in ratio of pension expenditure to GDP or on the basis of implicit liabilities. The countries
with highest expenditure growth are those with the greatest liabilities. Exceptions are represented by
Australia, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (Table 6).
On the contrary, the ranking of countries in terms of the current spending levels (see OECD, 2001)
does not correspond to their ranking in terms of implicit liabilities. One can expect that countries
with the highest pension expenditure-to-GDP ratios have the greatest accrued liabilities, but they do
not necessarily have the greatest open system liabilities.
This survey clearly indicates that there is considerable uncertainty concerning the size of pension





Expenditure projections and liabilities provide different indications concerning the future of pension
schemes. Expenditure projections are a flow concept. They do not require any discounting but they
must be compared with a relevant denominator. Liabilities are a stock concept. They are computed
by discounting future flows.
Expenditure projections and liabilities refer to different future flows. In terms of the definition
developed in Section 4, expenditure projections implies taking into account (a) all the accrued
liabilities of pensioners and workers, (b) the gross liabilities of current workers (i.e. the gross value
of the workers’ component of the second liabilities definition) and (c) the gross liabilities of
perspective workers (i.e. the gross value of the perspective workers’ component of the third
liabilities definition).
                                                
65 The main assumptions are a nominal GDP growth rate of 4 per cent and a nominal rate of interest equal to 6 per






Country Ranking for changes in





implicit liabilities Implicit liabilities.
  Australia 15 1.8 10 227
  Austria 12 2.5 13 207
  Belgium 11 3.5 12 212
  Canada 3 5.8 2 379
  Denmark 13 2.3 16 143
  Finland 6 4.7 4 371
  France 10 3.9 8 237
  Germany 5 5.0 14 180
  Greece 9 4.0 9 229
  Ireland 7 4.4 6 270
  Italy 18 0.0 17 79
  Japan 17 0.7 18 77
  Netherlands 4 5.3 7 247
  Norway 1 9.6 1 895
  Portugal 8 4.2 15 170
  Spain 2 8.0 3 375
  Sweden 16 1.3 5 293
  UK 19 –0.6 19 71
  United States 14 2.1 11 223
Source: calculations based on Frederiksen (2001).41
The following Figure qualitatively depicts the relationship between pension expenditure projections
and the various definitions of pension liabilities, where liabilities are as defined in Box 4
(accrued-to-date liabilities are given by LP(t) + LW1(t); future gross benefits of current and
perspective workers are WFB(t) and FWB(t), respectively). In particular, at a given point in time
(time A) accrued-to date liabilities are going to die out as the last pensioner exits the system; later





To better understand the relationship between pension liabilities and pension expenditure it would
be advisable to distinguish between expenditure components, i.e. between expenditure relating to
accrued liabilities, to future liabilities of current workers and to future liabilities of perspective
workers. The composition of pension expenditure projections can provide information on the
feasibility of pension reforms: the larger the accrued component the less likely reforms are and, if
















In addition it could also be advisable to compute not only expenditure projections but also liabilities
projections, especially with reference to the accrued-to-date definition. Indeed, the stability of such
projections can indicate that the system is not likely to run into problems. The opposite holds, if
such projections are on an increasing path.
Consequently, it would be advisable to have information concerning all the three liabilities’
definitions as they provide different types of hints.
The use of expenditure projections or of the different definition of pension liabilities depend on the
issue to be examined.
*	
++ 	!Although pension schemes are likely to exert the
greatest strains on developed countries’ budgets in the next few decades, a wider approach is
required in the assessment of the effects of ageing. Demographic changes will actually influence
most expenditure items: population ageing will increase health care expenditure since the
consumption of services raises steeply with age; it will also increase the demand for some social
services; the decline in the number of young people will provide an opportunity to reduce education
expenditure; the decline in total population growth, and in some countries the decline of total
population, might reduce the requirements for capital expenditure.
Fiscal sustainability should be assessed with an accounting framework that considers all budgetary
items.
66 Pension expenditure projections can be easily combined with projections for other
budgetary items. On the contrary, referring to liabilities rather than to spending would be
problematic with reference to health, long-term care, welfare and education outlays.
Moreover, netting out of earmarked contributions is not relevant when assessing the overall
sustainability of fiscal policy. It discriminates against systems which finance pension expenditure
also with general taxation (and not only contributions).
67
*	+ 	!The pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio and
the contribution rate that assure the cash balance of pension schemes give straightforward
indications concerning sustainability. On the other hand, neither the size of accrued liabilities nor
those of present pensioners’ and workers’ liabilities and open system liabilities indicate whether the
schemes are sustainable (see Section 4).
Moreover, age-related expenditure projections can provide more intuitive indications than liabilities
measures and are less sensitive to underlying assumptions. Small changes in starting conditions and
                                                
66 See Auerbach 	 (1991) and Kotlikoff (1992).
67 The CBO (2004) stresses that “the term “unfunded liability” has been used to refer to a gap between the
government’s projected financial commitment under a particular program and the revenues that are expected to be
available to fund that commitment. But no government obligation can be truly considered “unfunded” because of
the US government’s sovereign power to tax – which is the ultimate resource to meet its obligations.”43
assumptions can determine large shifts of pension liabilities (EPC, 2003). Moreover, as all
liabilities’ measures are a stock measure based on present value calculations they share the
drawback of being highly sensitive to changes in the discount rate. Moving to flow variables can
allow to get rid of this latter problem.
However, liability measures can provide other types of information. Accrued liabilities indicate the
cost of closing the scheme. Open-system liabilities, which include new net expected pension rights,
provide a measure of the difference between the implicit return on contributions to PAYG schemes
and some rate of return assumed as a benchmark. Estimates of new net rights do not provide any
measure of present and future cash imbalances, nor do they provide information on the need to
adjust contribution rates or benefit rules, or on pressures on the budget.
*	 " – Within the European debate on the
effectiveness of the Stability and Growth Pact, several proposals to render fiscal soundness and
structural reforms compatible have been put forward. In November 2002 the European Commission
stressed that, for countries which have already made substantial progress towards the achievement
of the medium-term target set by the Stability and Growth Pact, a small and temporary deterioration
in the underlying budget position could be envisaged in the face of structural reforms.
Applying this idea to pension reforms means “trading” a temporary worsening in today’s fiscal
balance for a reduction in future deficit and debt via a reform of the pension system: once a country
had put structural reforms into effect, the medium-term target would be modified accordingly.
Suppose that a country is allowed to worsen its deficit at time  in the face of commitments to
reduce its debt below a certain threshold by time < via a pension reform. The assessment of this
“trade” could be dealt with in two ways.
First, as each period debt is the previous period debt plus current deficit, one can estimate the
reduction in pension expenditure due to the reform and so the corresponding improvement in future
deficits and so the new debt development path which guarantees a certain debt level at time <.
Alternatively, one can estimate the change in future liabilities due to the reform (i.e. the discounted
flow of changes in pension spending). Nevertheless, this second solution is not easy to deal with as
it is not straightforward to assess the relationship between deficit, conventional debt and pension
liabilities. Therefore, referring to pension expenditure rather than to pension liabilities seems more
intuitive and easier to implement.
*	#+ "	!Pension liabilities can be more effectively used to
evaluate the fiscal impact on consumption and saving ratios, of deficits in accrual terms, and of the
economic balance of pension schemes.
As present pensioners’ and workers’ liabilities basically correspond to social security wealth, they
are relevant for the assessment of fiscal effects on saving decisions. Furthermore, they highlight the
future cost of present pension policies and they may reduce the incentive “for fiscal authorities to44
substitute away from cash to non-cash activities as a means of circumventing constraints on the




A broad assessment of fiscal sustainability in EU countries requires complementing the current
deficit and debt indicators with forward-looking indicators. In this context, estimates of the impact
of the pension system on the budget are necessary. This can be achieved either via projections of
future pension spending or via estimates of pension liabilities. In the previous Section we have
examined the different properties of the two indicators and have argued that the use of expenditure
projections or of the different definition of pension liabilities depend on the issue to be examined.
We have also underlined that pension expenditure projections seem the most appropriate tool for
sustainability analysis.
As noted in Section 3, the availability and quality of pension expenditure projections in the EU have
greatly improved but there remain significant problems, which hampers their use in assessing fiscal
sustainability. In particular, projection comparability among EU countries is still unsatisfactory.
Furthermore, progress is still required both in the organisation of projections and in their technical
features both at the national and at the EU level.
Improvements in the quality of pension expenditure projections would also enhance the quality of
estimates of pension liabilities.
,	
-	– In a rapidly changing demographic context, where reforms of social
policies continue to be politically problematic, more attention needs to be paid to the way in which
projections are organised, in particular to the attribution of responsibilities, to the accountability
requirements and to the frequency and transparency of the exercises. The availability of accurate
long-term projections is a necessary condition for the efficient design of social policy.
Projections indicating a significant increase in future spending necessarily trigger discussion of
reform. By contrast, the lack of projections can allow reforms to be avoided or deferred. In the end,
only if public opinion has sufficient awareness of future long-term obligations will reform be
politically practicable (Boeri 	, 2000).
In light of the greater role that long-term sustainability is going to play in the EU fiscal framework,
in principle the most appropriate solution would be to assign the responsibility for pension
expenditure and pension liabilities estimates to a unique institution at the EU level. This solution,
which would ensure the comparability of national projections, raises two problems. First, it would
require that all EU countries agree on a common method and accept a certain the loss of
                                                
68 Towe (1991, p. 126).45
sovereignty. Second, on a more technical ground, a unified forecasting authority and a common
method may imply losses in terms of details and quality of projections. This problem can be dealt
with only if a close link is established between the new institution and the national authorities in
order to allow the former to benefit of the expertise of the latter.
An alternative solution would be that of retaining the current responsibility of national institutions
while strengthening the coordination concerning the organisation of projections. This is the
approach followed so far at the EU level. Tighter common guidelines and greater peer pressure
would increase comparability and transparency. A step in this direction is envisaged for the 2005
projection exercise of the AWG. However, additional efforts need to be made in eliminating
differences in coverage, models and techniques. Adjustments for individual country specific
circumstances should be kept to a minimum. Allowed differences should be explained in detail and
motivated.
The following general points apply to both organisational scenarios.
.	 – Both expenditure projections and pension
liability estimates should be detached from policy considerations and from country specific
interests. The agencies assigned to produce forecasts should not be those responsible for fiscal and
social policy. Ideally, forecasts should be assigned to a technical agency that answers directly to
Parliament.
An alternative solution would be the coexistence of a number of different public and private
forecasting institutions. In this case, no monopoly on data should be allowed and the costs of
running forecasting models should be lowered. This could be achieved by requiring the public
agencies that hold data to make them promptly available to all interested parties. Forecasting models
developed in the public sector should be made available to all possible users.
/	 – Forecasts should be made on a regular basis (for instance every two or
three years), not in connection with political evaluation of the effects of specific reforms.
69 This
would enhance the credibility of projections.
	  – Repetition of forecasting exercises inevitably means the revision of previous
results. This may be due to changes in the demographic and economic framework or to changes in
the model.
70 Every exercise should have a detailed discussion of the reasons for the revision. This
enhances transparency and heightens the incentive for accurate projections.
The results of the projections should be released in the form of analytical papers that allow for an
assessment of the underlying assumptions and that include tests of sensitivity to demographic,
                                                
69 Castellino (1997) underscores the importance of repeating forecasting exercises.
70 Fornero (1997) suggests running the models “backwards” to see whether, using the actual values of the
demographic and economic variables, they accurately “predict” spending.46
economic and behavioural variables. The reports should provide detailed information about
different indicators. For instance, in the case of pension expenditure, both the ratio of outlays to
GDP and the equilibrium contribution rate should be given. There should be detailed projections on
the number of pensioners and the size of the average pension, broken down by type of pension and
category of worker. In a system in which public pensions also provide income support to
unemployed in working age, the preparation of consolidated accounts of social spending by
age-groups would help to isolate and evaluate the functions actually performed by the pension
system. Estimates of pension liabilities should also be provided, in particular concerning accrued
liabilities.
,		 – The quality of pension expenditure projections has greatly improved in
recent years. However, further progress is required in a number of areas.
0+ = Projections, as well as estimates of liabilities, should cover all pension schemes. In
order to evaluate the overall effects of ageing, projections should cover also the other age-related
public expenditure items, such as health, long-term care and education. In addition, one should aim
at projecting also other expenditure items and revenue, in order to allow an assessment of the
overall sustainability of the public finances.
(	 – Projections should be based on demographic scenarios prepared, for the sake of
comparability, by Eurostat with the involvement of national statistical institutes. They should cover
a period sufficiently long (at least 50 years) to let the size and age structure of the population to
converge towards a new equilibrium level and to allow all persons currently in the labour force to
retire. However, projections should also consider the non-demographic factors affecting pension
spending, such as the composition of the workforce and the retirement decisions of individuals.
71
1"	 – Forecasting models are generally deterministic and the assumptions
concerning demographic and economic variables are often based on their own past performance.
This mainly reflects the difficulty of handling models that must consider many economic,
demographic and behavioural factors and yet produce results quite quickly. Estimates are generally
based on scenario analysis.
72 The issue of evaluating uncertainty can be tackled in different ways.
One can associate probabilities to forecast ranges stemming from alternative scenarios.
73 One can
also use stochastic simulations assigning a probability to an arbitrarily large sample of input
                                                
71 Additional efforts should be made in modelling public spending on health and long-term care taking into account
also non-demographic factors (past expenditure trends, “death-related” costs, the degree of institutionalised
provision of long-term care and the change in the health care status of older people).
72 This is only a first step towards a determination of the uncertainty in the estimates since projections do not usually
incorporate any overall measures of probability for the input scenarios and therefore it is not possible to evaluate
the likelihood of the results. This approach allows evaluating how results would be affected if all the values for
inputs moved in the same direction even though remaining plausible. The high and low estimates serve as
boundaries.
73 See Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (1999).47
combinations, solve for the system’s finances under each set of paths and then use the probability
associated with each set of inputs to create a probability distribution for the outputs.
74
	 – It is important that the data on which projections are based are frequently and regularly
updated and promptly made available to forecasters.
75 In particular, given the rapid evolution of
family structures, the probabilities of the main family events need regular revisions. For instance, it
would be useful to have a protocol whereby the institutions supplying the data needed for
forecasting pledge to release them regularly. These factors must necessarily be considered in
assessing the effects of changes in the role of the social protection system and in estimating the
associated spending.
   	  – Every forecast is based on a large number of assumptions
concerning demographic trends, economic variables and individual behaviour. It is obviously
important that the projection reports make these assumptions explicit and describe their margin of
uncertainty. Moreover, the reports should consider whether the simplifying assumptions ordinarily
used in all projections are effectively justified. In age-related expenditure forecasts, for example,
there should be greater attention to analysis of the main demographic and behavioural variables by
cohort, to avoid simplistic assumptions producing unrealistic spending forecasts.
76 In particular, one
would need a careful evaluation of the estimates of survival for the very old (over 80), since it has
been observed that those now available tend to overestimate mortality (Caselli, 1996, and National
Research Council, 2001). The assumptions concerning family events (marriage, age and status of
survivors, etc.) and individuals’ behavioural choices need to be set out in detail. It would be helpful
to have a breakdown by age, sex and year of forecast, of assumptions on the retirement probability
of individuals in the retirement age bracket.
 2. – The level of pension spending depends on the evolution of the labour market.
The equilibrium contribution rate critically depends on it. The key factors are the participation rates
of older workers and of women.
77 Spending forecasts should be based on studies concerning, for
                                                
74 In stochastic models, inputs take values based on random variables and final forecasts result from the application
of Monte Carlo simulations (Meyerson and Sabelhouse, 2000; CBO, 2003). A stochastic approach solves some of
the problems set out above but may complicate the forecasting process. It requires simulating several demographic
processes for each year in the forecast concerning e.g. births, deaths, marriages, divorces and immigration. This
may require developing a model for each of these processes and relate them with one another or develop a unique
model containing all details at the cost of a higher simplification of reality.
75 For example, in recent Italian projections the Ragioneria Generale dell Stato uses data from INPS (1989) on the
probabilities of key family events, even though it is well known that family trends in Italy have changed
substantially in the intervening years. The number of households has increased, their average size has decreased
and the number of persons living alone has increased.
76 In order to limit the gap between forecasts and outcomes, Lacasse (1994), Reynauld and Vidal (1994) and Strobel
(1994) stress the importance of a correct identification of potential beneficiaries of the social programmes and of
the study of their behaviour, since individuals may change their behaviour in order to be entitled to social benefits.
77 The importance of this is underscored in OECD (1995a and 1995b) and is made plain in the exercises conducted
for Economic Policy Committee (2000) with reference to the “Lisbon Scenario”. See also European Commission48
instance, the incentives to retire provided by social security rules, workers’ retirement choices and
the present and future health conditions of elderly citizens.
78 Forecasts should be able to use data on
career histories, earnings and marital status of individuals. The need to consider the retirement
behaviour of individuals is accentuated by the tendency to allow individuals to freely decide their
retirement age within a certain age bracket.
79
3+ 	=  Projections should provide the information needed to evaluate the overall
standard of living of the elderly. In particular, they should specify the size of public pensions paid to
various groups of citizens according to age, sex, place of residence and family status.
80 The data on
public pensions should be supplemented by those on private pension plans and other incomes to
produce an assessment of the overall economic situation of retirees. Obviously, public pension
programmes interact with public action in other areas of social protection.
81 A reduction in public
retirement provisions not offset by an increase in other incomes could trigger stronger demand for
action and also for certain types of health care services. Only if these aspects are taken into account
can one truly judge the social sustainability of social security rules or reforms. Studies of the overall
economic situation of retirees, which requires microsimulation models, could be performed less
frequently than spending projections and could be assigned to different agencies.
B '
A growing concern about the sustainability of pension systems, health expenditure growth and
rising welfare spending have urged many governments to produce long-term projections. In the last
two decades, the latter have assumed an important role in the fiscal policy debate and in the
formulation of public policy.
The procedures by which projections are forged and the content of projections are essential elements
in social policy management and even more for pension policy.
                                                                                                                                                                 
(2000b). The question is also examined in Visco (2001). For a discussion of the linkage between labour market and
the size of pensions in Italy, see Peracchi (1999).
78 This will require the formation of data banks which follow the evolution of various cohorts over time. On this see
National Research Council (2001). Jimeno (2000) notes that without data on the employment and earnings history
of individuals it is hard to evaluate the effects of reforms.
79 Peracchi 	 (2001) emphasise the importance of longitudinal surveys providing demographic and economic
information.
80 For a study along these lines see Sartor (2001), who gives estimates of the equilibrium contribution rate for private
sector employees and of the average pension of different age cohorts. Sartor used sample data and relates the
results for the pension system to a generational accounting exercise.
81 This is taken into consideration in OECD (1999).49
Over recent years the availability and quality of long-term pension expenditure projections has been
largely improved and resources assigned to them have been substantially increased. Projections are
now available for all EU countries. Progress has been achieved in the comparability of national
exercises.
Three main trends characterise the European scene as regards the long-term analysis of public
budgets:
•   the rapid spread of projection exercises to all countries and a tendency to conduct them on a
regular basis, not contingent on reform proposals;
•   the increasingly close linkage of the analysis of pension spending to the sustainability of public
finances as a whole (the dynamics of pension expenditure is examined together with that of
other items connected with demographic changes and with the dynamics of the budget balance
and the public debt);
•   the awareness that trends in pension spending, through their impact on the budget balance, have
repercussions at EU level and, hence, the need for internationally comparable projections and
for systematic monitoring of spending in each country.
However, the organisation, comparability and quality of projections still present several limitations.
The national institutions assigned to make the projections are often those responsible for designing
social policy, which may affect both the availability and the substance of the forecasts. National
projections are produced with different models and coverage is not homogeneous. The information
made public is often not sufficient for an adequate assessment of the forecasting exercises and for
conducting alternative exercises.
Further efforts should therefore be devoted to pension projections both at the national and the EU
level.
An appropriate measurement at the EU level requires not only common assumptions, but also
common forecasting procedures and coverage. This requires further integration among national
forecasting institutions.
Forecasts should cover a well-defined and long projection period and should be made on a regular
basis. There is need for a detailed description of the assumptions and the results. Changes with
respect to previous exercises should be explained. Furthermore, forecasts should be assigned to a
technical agency that is not involved in the design of pension policy. Alternatively, projections
should be carried out by a number of different public and private forecasting institutions. The data
on which projections are based should be frequently updated and promptly made available to
forecasters. The projection reports should specify all the underlying assumptions and allow a
detailed assessment of the results.50
The pension-projection results should be expressed both in terms of expenditure-to-GDP ratios and
equilibrium contributory rate and in terms of accrued liabilities.
The assessment of the sustainability of pension systems and the pressure of pension schemes on the
budgets should primarily refer to expenditure to GDP ratios and equilibrium contributory rates.
Pension liabilities should not be included in the deficit and debt measures used in evaluating current
fiscal policy.
Estimates of pension liabilities may nevertheless represent a useful complement to conventional
debt and deficit measures. They bring a clearer understanding of fiscal impact on consumption and
saving ratios, and of some aspects of the economic situation of PAYG schemes. Namely, accrued
liabilities are useful for the measurement of economic deficits. They also provide a measure of the
cost of terminating PAYG pension schemes. Present pensioners’ and workers’ liabilities, which
correspond to Social Security Wealth, are relevant for the assessment of fiscal effects on saving
decisions.51
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Long-term fiscal projections were carried out as early as in 1942 when a 30 year estimate of social
expenditure in the UK was included in the Beveridge Report. However, it is from the mid-1980s,
when it became apparent that Western countries were experiencing major changes in their
demographic structure, that an increasing number of studies have examined the long-term prospects
for public budgets (Heller, 2003). This development is related to the growth of legislated policy
commitments in social insurance, to better capacity of modelling and simulating economic trends
and to the public debate on demographic issues.
Two lines of research have been followed. Many studies evaluated the prospects of the main age-
related expenditure programs and produced projections of the ratio of age-related expenditure to
GDP. Other studies aimed at developing synthetic indicators of the long-term fiscal performance.
The studies examining the prospects of expenditure programmes focus on budget items particularly
dependent on population age structure, such as pension, health and education spending. The basic
intuition is that citizens of different sex and age groups receive from government different amounts
of services and transfers. In these studies data on per capita public spending for different age-groups
and for different budgetary items are combined with demographic projections. Some studies only
consider the effects of demographic changes, while others also try to capture some non-
demographic factors such as pension scheme maturation and long-term trends towards higher health
expenditure.
(        	= The most basic approach
provides estimates of the effects of demographic changes on public expenditure under the
assumption that age-related per capita expenditure levels remain constant over the projection period
in real terms or in per capita GDP terms. In other words, it is assumed that present standards of
transfers and services are maintained for all population age-groups and that there is no behavioural
response from governments or households to demographic changes and their budgetary effects.
Age-related expenditure profiles thus form the building block of studies evaluating the impact of
changing demographics on public expenditure. They are computed by estimating the average
amount spent for members of each sex and age group on the basis of administrative data or
economic surveys (Franco and Munzi, 1997). The profiles for the base year can be combined with
the future expected structure of the population in order to evaluate the mechanical impact of
demographic changes on public spending.
Expenditure profiles for different budgetary items can be projected into the future on the basis of the
assumption that expenditure for the members of each age group increases at a yearly rate equal to
the rate of growth of GDP per worker or to the rate of growth of per capita GDP. The former
assumption is reasonable for expenditure items mostly represented by wages. The latter is60
reasonable for transfers. The two assumptions lead to different estimates when the ratio of workers
to citizens changes.
Estimates combining data on per capita expenditures for different age-groups and for different
budgetary items with demographic projections are only indicative measures of the likely effects of
demographic change on public expenditure, since they do not take all relevant effects of
demographic changes into account.
82
First, mechanical estimates are based on the implicit assumption that the marginal cost of providing
services to a smaller or a larger number of individuals in each age group in the future will be equal
to the present average cost of these services (Pearson 	, 1989). In other words, it is assumed that
there are no economies or diseconomies of scale in the production of public services. This
assumption is surely implausible over relatively short periods, because of time lags in the
adjustment of inputs to changes in the demand for public services.
Second, mechanical estimates implicitly assume that demographic changes do not modify present
age-related per capita expenditure levels, while they can actually affect them through many different
channels (Pearson 	, 1989). Demographic changes can influence the cost of inputs used in
services (e.g., a relative shortage of young workers may increase the cost of public services
employing them) and the demand for some services (e.g., a reduction in the number of children per
household may, in the long run, increase the demand for elderly care). They can also affect
productivity trends, wage rates and saving ratios.
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While the failure to consider economies and diseconomies of scale may compromise short-period
estimates, that concerning system-wide effects may affect long-period estimates.
Moreover, it should be stressed that demographic change is just one of the several factors affecting
public expenditure dynamics. The contribution of mechanical estimates of the effects of
demographic changes to the assessment of the prospects for public expenditure is therefore
necessarily limited.
' 	 – Once non-demographic factors are taken
into consideration, there is no reason why age-related per capita expenditure levels remain constant
in real terms or in per capita GDP terms on the initial level over the projection period. Standards of
transfers and services will change over time.
                                                
82 This point is made in OECD (1988), pp. 27-28.
83 The use of current per capita age-profiles to project expenditure levels is particularly problematic for health care.
Several studies note that a sizeable share of health expenditure occurs in the final part of life. This implies that the
number of deaths occurring each year also affects expenditure. It also implies that an increase in life expectancy
may have limited effects on lifetime health expenditure. See Zweifel 	 (1995).61
While several economic, political and social factors can obviously affect the dynamics of per capita
transfers and services, the studies examining the prospects of age-related expenditure usually focus
only on three specific factors: the effects of changes introduced in legislation, but not yet embodied
in present expenditure profiles; the continuation of structural expenditure trends; and the effects of
structural changes in the economy and society. These factors are considered because they are
consistent with a constant policy approach, while there is usually no attempt to predict the effects of
changes in behaviours and policies.
The effects of changes introduced in legislation, but not yet embodied in present expenditure
profiles, are particularly relevant for pension expenditure projections, since pension eligibility and
transfer ratios can change considerably over time due to the maturation of schemes, i.e. the process
of adjustment of all pensions to present retirement rules. On the one hand, pension coverage
extensions and benefit improvements usually only produce their full effects on the two ratios after
many decades. On the other, quite often reforms curtailing pension benefits are implemented
gradually and only display their full effects a long time later (OECD, 1988b).
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The continuation of structural expenditure trends (i.e., the assumption that some non-demographic
factors relevant in the past would continue to affect expenditure dynamics in the future) is especially
relevant for health care expenditure projections. In several countries the health sector has for long
periods recorded a price deflator substantially higher than the GDP deflator and a tendency towards
a continuous increase in per capita consumption.
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Projections can also forecast the effects of structural changes in economic structure, labour market
and household composition. The basic idea is that entitlement to and provision of public transfers
and services depend on certain characteristics of citizens. For instance, a change in the composition
of employment can affect spending for unemployment benefits. A change in the number of single
parents or in the number of elderly living alone can affect the demand for welfare services.
Projections integrating the mechanical effects of demographic changes with estimates of some
additional factors influencing pension and health expenditure were produced by the IMF in 1986 for
the seven main Western economies (Heller 	, 1986). The growth in the number of pensioners
and the dynamics of the average pension were projected taking the maturity of the different systems
into consideration. As to health expenditure, the study outlined a scenario in which average medical
costs were rising more rapidly than productivity.
                                                
84 Therefore, the assumption that age-related per capita expenditure levels remain constant is not equivalent to a
constant policy assumption. It implies that all the effects of changes introduced in legislation are reflected in
present age-related per capita expenditure levels.
85 OECD (1993) decomposed nominal health care expenditure growth over the period 1980-1990 for the OECD area
(11.8 per cent per year) into the effects of general inflation (8 per cent), medical specific inflation (0.7 per cent),
and the increase in volume of services (2.9 per cent, of which 2.4 per cent was attributed to the increase in per
capita services and only 0.3 per cent was due to the ageing process).62
The overall impact of ageing populations on government budget was also examined in the studies
carried out by OECD in 1995-96 (see Leibfritz ., 1995, Roseveare 	, 1996 and OECD,
1996) and by the European Commission in 1997 (see Franco and Munzi, 1997). Growing awareness
of population ageing has also led to a substantial increase in the resources devoted to national long-
term public expenditure projections. Most developed countries now have long-term projections of
pension spending and, in some cases, also of expenditure on health care and other budget items
linked to the demographic structure.
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 	=The forecasting models currently in use were developed gradually as needs for
knowledge emerged. They employ a wide variety of methodologies. In moving from the mechanic
projection of changes in the age-structure of the population to the assessment of several economic
and social factors, the models have gradually become more complex. The projection of individual
expenditure items has frequently been replaced by a wider analysis of the evolution of the public
finances as a whole in a macroeconomic framework.
The models are generally deterministic and based on microdata such as sample surveys of the
population or administrative data supplied by social security administrations. With a view to past
performance, assumptions are made on the level of fertility, change in mortality, immigration levels,
wages, unemployment rates, productivity and inflation rate.
Models are often organised in different modules: a first one for projecting the evolution in
population; a second one directed to grouping people on the basis of their characteristics relevant to
projections; a third one which actually projects long-term age-related expenditure. Some countries
developed models finalised to project only some expenditure items dependent on the age structure;
other countries have models aimed at evaluating the effects of ageing on the overall public finances.
Projection results are obviously tentative given the uncertainty of the underlying demographic and
economic scenarios and the specification of the models, which tend to be as simplified as possible.
The latter aspect reflects the twofold necessity of handling models that must contemplate many
economic, demographic and behavioural factors and allow for the production of simulations over
relatively short periods of time. In order to deal with the uncertainty issue, several scenarios
matching different set of assumptions are frequently considered (baseline scenario, more favourable
scenario, less favourable scenario).
Dynamic microsimulation models allow to consider the interaction of a number of economic and
demographic factors. They provide indications concerning both expenditure trends and other
factors, such as the evolution of income, wealth and family status of individuals. This may give a
broader view of the sustainability of current policies. For instance, a reduction of public pensions
may be considered sustainable if it is offset by an increase in other sources of income of the elderly.
                                                
86 See the survey in Franco and Marino (2004).63
Stochastic models have also been developed over recent years. In this case, inputs take values based
on random variables and the final forecasts, based on iterated simulations of the model, reflect the
distribution of results (Meyerson and Sabelhouse, 2000). Demographic and economic inputs are
allowed to vary throughout the forecasting period according to inferences based on historical data.
Stochastic approaches give a better insight of the interaction of different factors. The forecasting
process becomes more complex.
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87 Stochastic models require the simulation of many demographic processes for each year in the forecast (e.g., the
number of births and their distribution by sex; the distribution of marriages and divorces by age-group and sex;
immigration by age and sex) jointly with the economic performance. This requires the construction of a model for
each of these processes and interrelations relating each of them with one another and with the underlying economic
model.